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The use of wireless radio technology is well established for narrowband access systems, but its 
use for broadband access is relatively new. Wireless mesh architecture is a first step towards 
providing high-bandwidth wireless network coverage, spectral efficiency, and economic 
advantage. 
 
However, the widespread adoption and use of Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) as a backbone 
for large wireless access networks and for last-mile subscriber access is heavily dependent on the 
technology’s ease of deployment.  In order for WMNs to be regarded as mainstream technology, 
it needs to gain a competitive edge compared to wireline technologies such as DSL and cable. 
 
To achieve this, a broadband wireless network must be self-configuring, self-healing and self-
organizing.  In this thesis, we address these challenges. First, we propose a four-stage scheme 
(power-up, bootstrapping, network registration, and network optimization).  We develop 
algorithms for each of these stages, taking advantage of the inherent properties of WMNs to 
determine the network’s topology.   
 
The novel part of our scheme is in the de-coupling of the subscriber’s credentials from the 
network hardware.  This is a key part of our architecture as it helps ensure quick network 
enrolment, management and portability.  It also helps, in our opinion, make the concept of 
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C h a p t e r 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless technology is well established but its use for commercial broadband access is relatively 
new. Wireless mesh architecture is a first step towards providing high-bandwidth network 
coverage. It is critical to large-scale wireless networks with no pre-existing infrastructure as it 
enables quick-and-easy extension of a local area network into wider area. The Mesh architecture 
helps sustain signal strength by breaking long distances into a series of shorter hops.  
Intermediate nodes not only boost the signal, but cooperatively make forwarding decisions 
based on their knowledge of the network. Such architecture provides high network coverage, 
spectral efficiency, and economic advantage. 
 
The major incentives for the deployment of wireless mesh networks come from their envisioned 
advantages: extended coverage, robustness, self-configuration, easy maintenance, and low cost. 
In spite of the high attention and the massive efforts on research and development, wireless 
mesh networks have not yet widespread adoption.  One of the key economic drivers of WMN is 
that they are quicker and cheaper to deploy than existing wireline technologies.  It has been 
noted that without this key incentive, WMNs will not achieve acceptability in the marketplace.   
 
Recently, interesting commercial applications of wireless mesh networks (WMN) have emerged. 
One example of such applications is “community wireless networks”. Several vendors have 
recently offered WMN products. Some of the most experienced in the business are Nortel [ 1], 
Cisco Networks [2], Tropos Networks [ 3], and BelAir Networks [ 4]. There has been a lot of 
startup activity in this technology space as the concept of the ubiquitous wireless access holds a 
lot of promise.  The promise is supported as well by the work of standards bodies such as the 
IEEE 802.11s Working Group [5].  However, much more remains to be done before WMNs 
realize their full potential. 
 
One major obstacle to the widespread deployment of WMNs as a connectivity solution for large 
wireless access networks is the long-term operational efficiency of running such a network.  In 
today's world of rapid technology innovation, the cost of hardware (capital expenditure or 




‘CapEx’) is rapidly falling while the cost of running the infrastructure (operational expenditure or 
‘OpEx’) keeps rising.  Hence, even though WMNs offer the promise of quick and easy 
deployment (in comparison with wired access technologies), the cost of maintaining a stable 
level of service is still prohibitively high.  As a result, over the lifetime of a network, wired access 
networks may actually turn out to be cheaper.  As noted in [6], the large footprint of wired 
alternatives e.g. Cable and DSL in urban areas also poses questions concerning the suitability of 
wireless technology as an alternative for last-mile connectivity. 
 
One key strategy to help make WMNs more competitive as a viable last-mile access technology 
is to make it possible for the network to automatically configure wireless mesh nodes in a 
distributed fashion while ensuring security and resource conflict resolution.  While this may 
sound daunting at first, the inherent properties of a WMN allow us to devise interesting schemes 
to address the issue.  The wireless backbone of mesh routers mainly relays mobile clients’ traffic 
to and from the Internet via gateways connected to the wired network. As a result, most of the 
traffic is directed to and processed by a few nodes (gateways).  These nodes would form 
bottlenecks as more and more packets contend for the channel as they are forwarded closer 
towards them.  The network scales better when the traffic pattern is kept local i.e. each node 
sends only to nearby gateways within a fixed radius, independent of the network size. For 
optimal performance, the WMN should be subdivided into disjoint trees (clusters). Within each 
tree, the "root" would serve as the gateway, connecting the nodes to the wired backbone.  
Strategically placing and connecting the gateways to the wired backbone is therefore critical to 
the management and efficient operation of a WMN.  
 
In this work, we seek to address this challenge by proposing a solution for the self-configuration 
of WMNs.  We describe a feasible architecture for wireless mesh networks utilizing a practical 
view on the usage scenarios.  We also explore critical factors influencing the performance and 
scalability of these networks, security issues (to ensure only authorized users are granted network 
access), billing/accounting that is beneficial for clients as well as providers. 
 






Our contributions can be summarized as follows. 
 
We propose an algorithm for the provisioning of wireless subscriber connectivity.  This 
algorithm allows end-point WMN nodes to be automatically provisioned and configured in a 
secure, distributed and conflict-free manner.  It also introduces the concept of decoupling the 
service from the hardware.   No other work in the literature presents a similar concept.   
 
The algorithm is both distributed and centralized.  The distributed portions include neighbour 
discovery, topology construction and beaconing.  The centralized aspects include monitoring 
agents deployed on nodes (used to monitor device and network metrics) and report to the 
central station, QoS and SLA guarantees and security.  A key aspect of our architectural 
framework is that is readily lends itself to a service-provider based service model.  We believe 
this is a critical feature of the system because, as we have already shown, WMNs have to pass 




The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents WMN characteristics and motivate our 
work. Chapter 3 describes the architectural framework in detail and addresses the service 
provisioning issues in a WMN.  Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the merits of the system and 
how it addresses the prevailing issues with WMN deployments today. Chapter 5 concludes our 
work. 




C h a p t e r 2 
 
THE CASE FOR WMNs 
 
Wireless mesh networks (WMN) have emerged as a key technology for next generation wireless 
networks, showing rapid progress and inspiring numerous applications. WMNs seem 
significantly attractive to network operators for providing new applications that cannot be easily 
supported by other wireless technologies. The major incentives for the deployment of wireless 
mesh networks come from their envisioned advantages: extended coverage, robustness, self-
configuration, easy maintenance, and low cost. Yet, in spite of the high attention and the 
massive efforts on research and development, wireless mesh networks have not yet witnessed 
mass market deployment. To promote the deployment of wireless mesh networks and enhance 
their usage, many factors have to be considered.   One of the key economic drivers of WMN is 
that, all things being equal, they are quicker and cheaper to deploy than existing wireline 
technologies.  It has been noted that without this key incentive, WMNs will not achieve 
acceptability in the marketplace.   
 
In this work, we seek to address this challenge by proposing a solution to the self-configuration 
of WMNs.  We describe a feasible architecture for wireless mesh networks utilizing a practical 
view on the usage scenarios.  We also explore critical factors influencing the performance and 
scalability of these networks, security issues (to ensure only authorized users are granted network 




A WMN is a two-tier architecture based on wireless multi-hop transmission. A WMN is 
composed of Wireless Mesh Clients (WMC) and Wireless Mesh Routers (WMR). The 
latter offers connectivity to the former by acting like access points (APs), forming at the 
same time a self-organized wireless backbone.  It is possible that the WMC may have 
clients themselves.  A typical example will be a wireless home router that connects 
various peripherals in the home such as computers, printers, set top boxes and other 




This backbone has two possible roles. It can be either a standalone network simply 
offering inter-client connectivity or a local extension for the wired Internet if there are 
available connections between one or more WMR gateways. In both cases, the WMN’s 






















Figure 1  WMN Model 
 
The WMRs typically have multiple radio interfaces that serve as either backhaul or access 
links.  The backhaul links connect to other WMRs (backbone communication) while the 
access links (client communication) connect to the WMCs.  Typically the radio 











extending its range.  Communication in a WMN is heavily reliant on multi-hop 
communication.   
The IETF CAPWAP WG gives an architecture example of WMNs in [7] and a 
comprehensive survey on WMNs and related issues can be found in [8].  
 
WMNs offer considerable advantages as an Internet broadband access technology [9] 
[10]: 
 
• Spectral efficiency: The average link length and the average transmit power level fall 
as subscriber density rises. This is equivalent to moving from macro cells to 
micro cells, but without needing a large change in the network design. 
• Minimal risk of blind spots which means network coverage can approach 100%: Due to its 
multihop routing ability, line of sight to a single base station is not required; as 
long as a client has connectivity to any other client, it can obtain Internet access. 
It was shown in [11] that a WMN can significantly improve the coverage in 
comparison with point-to-multipoint (e.g., IEEE 802.16) solution, especially for 
scenarios with significant obstructions trees or skyscrapers. 
• Economic advantage: WMN has the advantage that customers’ wireless access 
points (routers) make up most of the equipments needed for the system. Upfront 
investments are minimal because the technology can be installed incrementally, 
one node at a time, whenever new customers request an access to the network. 
In addition, omni-directional antennas are normally used, which eliminate the 
cost and installation time (i.e. eliminates the burden of pointing antennas).  In 
WMNs, clients associate to a WMR without the need to run any routing feature 
or particular software module. This characteristic, coupled with the other 
advantages such as reduction in deployment cost, connecting hard-to-wire areas, 
resilience, self organization and self healing behaviour and the extensibility make 
the WMN architecture very appealing to network operators and service 
providers.  However, practical issues, particularly relating to performance, quality 
of service, security, network management and monitoring, scalability etc. need to 




be solved in order for WMNs to have a commercial breakthrough as a suitable 
technology for network operators and service providers. 
• Fast Deployment: Adding a new client to an existing WMN can take several hours 
instead of several months, the typical delay for installing new wires for cable or 
DSL. 
• Pleasing Aesthetics: There are many settings that can benefit from the lack of 
unsightly wires associated with Ethernet networks (e.g., show halls, airports, 
historic buildings, etc.). 
 
II. WIRELESS MESH ARCHITECTURES 
 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) architectures can be classified into three main groups 
based on the functionality of the mesh nodes: Client mesh, Infrastructure mesh and 
Hybrid mesh [8].  Figure 2 illustrates an example of this classification.  
 
 





Figure 2  Mesh Network Architectures 
 
The lower tier in the architecture diagram corresponds to the client mesh architecture 
which provides peer-to-peer ad-hoc connections among the mesh clients. This is also 
referred to as pure mesh, where most of the traffic is classified as intra-mesh traffic. In 
contrast, the infrastructure mesh architecture is portrayed at the middle-tier where mesh 
routers form a backbone infrastructure of self-healing, self-configuring links among 
themselves, for clients that connect to them.  The top tier illustrates the services (e.g 
Internet) that can be accessed via the lower tiers.  The hybrid mesh architecture, where 
mesh clients can connect to the service infrastructure through mesh routers as well as 
directly meshing with other mesh clients (assuming that the mesh clients can be directly 
connected to the service infrastructure). The traffic flows and hence the appropriate 
architecture depends on whether the content to be accessed is inside or outside the 
mesh.  Thus, the type of mesh architecture required in a given situation is typically driven 
by the user and application needs for content [12].  This architecture is the most 
applicable for commercial WMN deployments. 





In a WMN, customers' wireless access points make up most of the equipment needed 
for the rollout of the system. Each wireless access point (node) acts as a means of 
connecting that customer to the network and possibly forwarding neighbouring node 
traffic, extending the reach of the network. A dedicated radio is used for access links and 
remaining radios used for traffic forwarding (i.e. transit links).  Also, a WMN has a 
relatively stable topology except for occasional nodes failure or addition. The traffic in 
the backbone, being aggregated from a large number of end users, changes infrequently. 
The wireless backbone of mesh routers mainly relays users’ traffic to and from the 
Internet via gateways connected to the wired network. 
 




III. APPLICATIONS AND SCENARIOS 
 
Mesh networks have the potential to bring diverse advantages to wireless 
communications services, allowing clients to exchange information in a decentralized 
manner and also to extend coverage of cellular and other networks by allowing relay 
based networking at the edge terminals. Most of the technical challenges in mesh 
networks depend to a large extent on the environment and usage scenarios in which 
wireless mesh networks are used. Generally, wireless mesh networks can be classified 
into open and closed networks [13]. In open mesh networks, any client node may 
participate. These networks may belong to different operators or administrative domains 
constituting a mesh federation [14]. On the other hand, in closed or managed mesh 
networks, a certain authority exists and only known client nodes are accepted to join the 
mesh network. Based on these criteria, different usage scenarios are possible for both 
indoor and outdoor wireless mesh networks. 
 
There is no shortage of practical usage scenarios and applications for closed and open 
mesh networks.  These include a single meshed home network managed by the network 
owner for broadband home networking applications; a closed set of mesh nodes in a 
military environment where traffic flow must be kept confidential, thereby making the 
soldier-soldier communication more reliable and with a longer range; mesh APs 
deployed in university campuses or providing inexpensive campus-wide network 
coverage; an enterprise mesh network eventually eliminating the Ethernet backhaul for 
office WLAN based networks, which are particularly useful in office networking 
scenarios and also for health and medical system applications.  There has also been a 
movement towards deploying community mesh networks (CMNs).  These are typically 
deployed by operators in residential zones for provisioning of grass-roots communities 
wireless networks allowing them to share Internet connections via gateways.  Most of 
these deployments have been proof-of-concept and experimental in nature and not 
commercial in nature e.g. Roofnet [15].  Metro scale mesh networks are a broader 
version of CMNs which covers an entire metropolitan area in order to capacitate 




different city, county/municipality wide efforts for wireless broadband services, 
intelligent transportation services etc.  
 
Open mesh networks also provide excellent opportunities for mission critical 
applications and public safety efforts, particularly for emergency operations and for 
vehicular communications. With the vision of future communication infrastructure often 
being quoted with respect to the integration of all mobile and wireless nodes with the IP 
core, multiple ‘last-mile’ connectivity options need to become a reality.  WMNs can 
provide a viable alternate route, alongside WLAN and 3G etc., into such a core network.  
 
IV. MESH NETWORK STANDARDIZATION 
 
Several standardization bodies are actively working to define specifications for wireless 
mesh networking, targeting different types of networks. Dedicated IEEE Task Groups 
(TGs) have been established defining the requirements for mesh networking in Wireless 
Personal Area Networks (WPAN), WLANs, Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks 
(WMANs) and Mobile Broadband Wireless Access (MBWA) [16]. The IEEE 802.15.5 
TG was formed to determine the necessary mechanisms enabling mesh networking in 
WPANs PHY and MAC layers. The challenge is in providing lightweight 
implementations for mesh networking techniques considering the limited resources in 
the digital devices. 
 
Facing the throughput degradation and unfairness in IEEE 802.11 multihop networks, 
the IEEE 802.11s TG addresses the needs for wireless mesh in WLANs and aims to 
extend 802.11 architectures and protocols to provide ESS (Extended Service Set) mesh 
functionalities. The implementation of this specification shall be directly reflected over 
the existing PHY layer of IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n operating in the unlicensed spectrum of 
2.4 and 5 GHz. 
 
On the other hand, IEEE 802.16 standard targets WMANs and comprises some TGs 
related to mesh networking. The WiMAX forum is working to ensure the 




interoperability of manufactured equipments using these standard suites. IEEE 802.16a 
TG introduces the mesh mode enabling multihop communication, operating in the 
licensed and unlicensed lower frequencies of 2-11 GHz and covering up to 50 km. 
802.16a limitation concerns its target on the fixed broadband applications. Consequently, 
802.16j TG was created for Mobile Multihop Relay (MMR) to study the possibility of 
supporting mobile stations through using multihop relaying techniques. In addition, 
IEEE 802.16e TG is developing an amendment to 802.16a to support subscriber 
stations moving at vehicular speeds. Its target is to conceive a system for combined fixed 
and mobile broadband wireless access, operating in the 2-6 GHz licensed bands. 
Simultaneously, IEEE 802.20 WG intends to provide ubiquitous Mobile Broadband 
Wireless Access (MBWA) in a cellular architecture that supports the mesh networking 
paradigm. It addresses high speed mobility issues with speeds up to 250 km/h making it 
suitable for train networks, operating in licensed bands below 3.5 GHz. 
 
Furthermore, the ZigBee Alliance has been working on the specifications of Low Rate 
WPANs (LR-WPANs) based on 802.15.4.  The IETF Control and Provisioning of 
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) WG emerged with the objective to address 
architectures and operations of managing large scale WLANs deployments. Mesh 
networking is one of the architecture examples defined by this WG and is classified as 
distributed WLAN architectures. The CAPWAP efforts consider the 802.11 WLAN 
technologies, with a liaison with the IEEE 802.11s TG. This WG is looking for 
extensibility for future applicability to other access technologies especially the 802.16.  
Finally, Software Defined Radio (SDR) benefits from today’s high processing power to 
develop multi-band, multi-standard base stations and terminals [17]. SDR is promising to 
operator in increasing network capacity and simplifying reconfiguration, and aids 
manufacturers in providing multi-standard multi-band equipments, with reduced 
deployments efforts and costs.  As current standards target different mesh networks 
environments, network operators can benefit from several standards to provide scalable 
and progressive WMNs deployments. Operators are expected to provide an umbrella 
coverage integrating several standards with a real-time trade-off to offer the users the 
best possible service. 





V. CHALLENGES FOR WMNs 
 
As shown above, while WMNs have strong and attractive features of mesh networks 
make them worthy of consideration, a plethora of issues, challenges and options need to 
be addressed in order to enable the network operator to offer innovative services. Here 
we present some of these challenges. 
 
A.  Performance Issues 
 
The performance of any network is a critical factor that needs to be considered before it 
gets accepted and deployed at large scale for various commercial applications. In the 
context of WMNs, the issues which affect their performance include the following: 
 
• Distributed MAC & Multihop Communication:  Because of the ‘decentralized’ nature 
of mesh networks, the MAC function should be accomplished in a distributed 
manner i.e. to establish multi-point to multi-point links between the mesh nodes 
in the absence of centralized controller. Moreover, the MAC protocol for WMNs 
needs to have multihop communications at the core of its design.  The 
aforementioned requirements make the design of the MAC functions highly 
challenging. Several distributed channel assignment and MAC protocols have 
been proposed [18] [19] which improve the throughput in multi-hop paths. 
However they are still far from being optimum solutions to be exploited by the 
network operator for commercial deployments. Apart from these, one needs to 
properly identify the issues related to the spectral efficiency of both high 
frequency and low frequency mesh systems. Proper characterization for the mesh 
capacity constraints is very important in determining the practical utility of mesh 
networks and its enabling technologies. 
• Mesh Routing:  Mesh networking requires each node to share route information 
with other nodes. This functionality should be assured by the mesh routing 




protocol. Some efforts have been initiated to adapt the ad-hoc routing protocols 
for WMNs. However ad-hoc routing protocols lack various important 
performance factors such as scalability, fault tolerance, QoS metrics (fairness), 
load balancing, and lack of cross layer interaction. In addition, certain areas such 
as mobility and power management have totally different requirements in ad-hoc 
networks and WMNs.  This makes ad-hoc routing solutions not particularly 
suitable for WMNs.  
• Application and Service Perspective:  Every application and service has its own 
inherent characteristics which makes it perform well on one platform and not on 
another. Due to the distributed multihop features of mesh networks and the non 
significant support from the lower layers to assure certain quality of service 
support for the application layer, there is a pressing need to adapt the existing 
applications to WMN architecture.   
• Interoperability and Integration:  Due to the emergence and rapid growth of 
heteregenous wireless access technologies such as WiFi, WiMAX, UWB, various 
cellular systems etc., interoperability and integration are a major concern for 
future wireless systems.  While WMNs can probably serve as a unifying 
technology for all these disparate systems, more research still needs to be 
performed to ensure that seamless service can be offered to users irrespective of 
access technology. 
 
B.  Scalability 
 
Scalability, and consequently, reliability and robustness are important and inter-related 
issues to be addressed in order to enable the operation of the numerous embedded 
applications envisaged for WMN systems. At first, it would appear that these 
characteristics are inherently unachievable due to the self-adjusting and non-hierarchical 
nature of WMNs.  However, they are essential in any commercial network.  Scalability 
problems become even more severe as the WMN’s coverage grows.  As shown in [20], 
the bandwidth available for each node to originate packets decreases as the expected 
path length increases i.e., when the scale of the network increases, the end-to-end 




reliability and available bandwidth sharply drops, thereby diminishing the network 
performance.  When the issue of network latency is added to this, the equation becomes 
even more complicated and the guarantees of Quality-of-Service for the clients are 
disturbed.   
 
Designing a scalable mesh network requires the proper understanding of the complex 
inter-relationship between the contrasting network characteristics. This is especially true 
for applications that need to handle continuous data streams where high capacity is 
critical to maintain the scalability and reliability of the network. Careful design and 
proper characterization of the physical layer mechanisms depending on the envisaged 
application scenarios and an inherent foresight on the number of users, designing 
efficient and distributed backbone communication topologies [21] using hybrid multiple 
access schemes exploiting the availability of multi-radio, multi-channel systems, devising 
efficient routing protocols for transporting data robustly etc. can solve the existing 
scalability problems in WMNs. 
 
C.  Security 
 
Security is a critical step to deploy and manage WMNs. Two classes of attacks are likely 
to occur in WMNs:  
i) External attacks, in which attackers not belonging to the network jam the 
communication or inject erroneous information. 
ii) Internal attacks, in which attackers are internal compromised nodes that are 
difficult to be detected.  
Both types of attacks may be either passive intending to steal information and to 
eavesdrop on the communication within the network, or active modifying and injecting 
packets to the network.  Some of the prevailing issues are as follows: 
 
• Different Layers Attacks and Misbehaviours in WMNs:  Attacks can exist at different 
layers in WMNs causing the networks’ failure. At the physical layer, an attacker 
may jam the transmissions of wireless antennas or simply destroy the hardware 




of a certain node. At the MAC layer, an attacker may abuse the fairness of 
medium access by sending MAC control and data packets or impersonate a legal 
node. Attacks may occur in routing protocols such as advertising wrong routing 
updates. At the application layer, an attacker could inject false fake information, 
thus undermining the integrity of the application. Attackers may also sneak into 
the network by misusing the cryptographic primitives. Consequently, the 
exchange of cryptographic information should take place in a manner that 
utilizes equal participation, ensuring that a misbehaving party can not gain 
anything from misbehaviour.   
 
• Denial-of-service (DoS) events: Selfishness and greediness are two misbehaviours that 
are likely to take place in WMNs. Nodes may behave selfishly by not forwarding 
packets for others in order to save power, bandwidth or just because of security 
and privacy concerns. There have been approaches developed to detect 
selfishness and enforce distributed cooperation and are suitable for WMNs [22]. 
Some monitor neighbours to detect misbehaving nodes while others, in addition, 
incorporate penalties to provide an incentive for cooperation thereby keeping 
greedy behaviour to a minimum [23].  The DOMINO mechanism [24] solves the 
greedy sender problem in 802.11 WLANS with a possible extension to multihop 
wireless networks.  It should be noted that external DoS events where the radio 
signal itself gets jammed can also be considered as attacks.  However, they do 
not necessarily lead to a breach in security. 
 
• Authentication, Authorization and Accounting:  Authentication and authorization are 
important counter-attack measures in WMNs, allowing only authorized users to 
get connections via the mesh network and preventing adversaries to sneak into 
the network disrupting the normal operation.  Authentication, Authorization and 
Accounting (AAA) are provided in most of the WLANs applications and 
commercial services through a centralized server such as RADIUS. However, a 
“pure” centralized scheme is not appropriate in WMNs and secure key 
management is much more difficult. Thus, distributed authentication and 




authorization schemes with secure key management are important in WMNs. To 
allow users’ mobility with seamless and secure access to the offered services in 
the mesh network, authentication should be performed during mobile nodes’ 
roaming across different WMRs and across different domains.  The IEEE 
802.11i standard proposes a key caching option to mitigate the overhead of re-
authentication [25].  However it is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, in which 
a malicious access point uses previously cached authentication keys to dupe user 
nodes. Other vendors’ specific solutions are proposed by Cisco, Aruba and 
Trapeze networks, integrating a switched architecture in the 802.11i 
authentication aiming to centralize the storage of authentication keys, therefore 
to accelerate the re-authentication.  These solutions work well in WLANs 
applications, resolving the expensive overhead of re-authentication. However, 
there are no associated security mechanisms to prevent attacks on stored keys, 
and these solutions are not scalable to WMNs.  Finally, the Wireless Dual 
Authentication Protocol (WDAP) [22] provides dual authentication for wireless 
station and its corresponding AP/router in a wireless network via an 
authentication server. WDAP includes authentication, de-authentication and 
roaming authentication protocols and can be applied in WMNs considering 
wireless stations as user nodes with access points playing the role of mesh nodes. 
 
To further ensure security of WMNs, protocol integration is critical. Security 
mechanisms need to be embedded into MAC protocols to detect and prevent 
misbehaviour in channel access, and into network protocols providing a secure 
routing. As in wired networks, multi-layer security is desired as attacks occur 
simultaneously in different protocol layers. A cross-layer framework for security to 
detect and respond to attacks is necessary.  It is also necessary to provide sufficient 
capabilities for mutual authentication among nodes.  However, such schemes must 
generate as little overhead as possible due to the nature of the medium and node 
constraints such as limited power, processing capabilities or memory space. Also, 
unacceptable authentication delay might impact service continuity. 
 




D.  Accounting and Billing 
 
WMNs need special accounting mechanisms and tailored billing systems with 
appropriate business models considering the benefits of both mobile users and service 
providers. To assure service availability and continuity, inter-domain accounting is 
important in WMNs. High packet loss ratio and security requirements should be 
carefully handled in this case, where authentication, replay protection and data integrity 
are indispensable. The economic interests require the application of usage sensitive 
billing systems based on the gathered accounting information for each client.  
 
VI. FUTURE OF WMNs 
 
Wireless mesh networks have emerged as a promising new technology, where several 
vendors are offering services for their deployment. Cost of deployment of the network 
will be the main driving factor for the success of WMNs.  
 
Security is a strong challenge influencing the commercial deployments of WMNs, 
however there is still a strong need for efficient solutions adapted for different security 
requirements and for different usage scenarios. These solutions have to counter attack in 
all protocol layers, guaranteeing collaborative behaviours between mobile nodes. Trust 
relationships should exist among stakeholders for authentication, authorization, 
accounting and billing of end users. Well performing tools need to be developed for 
mesh design, maintenance, monitoring and management; such that the future’s mesh 
networks should be self managed rather than unmanaged ones. 
 
In Chapter 3, we propose an architectural framework that helps address the challenges in 
deploying WMNs for network operators.  This includes solutions for provisioning, 
security and billing issues.  We address the problem of provisioning by presenting a 
novel scheme where network credentials are de-coupled from the network hardware 
(similar to GSM cellular technology) such that network providers can operate a ‘hybrid’ 




architecture where credentials are centrally provisioned but deployed in the network in a 
distributed fashion.  We also address the issue of billing and inter-domain operability for 
‘roaming’ users.   
 
In this thesis, we leverage the properties of WMN to help ensure scalability of the 
framework while maintaining reliability.  We show, through protocol analysis, that this 
framework can help solve some of the major challenges currently faced in the WMN 
commercial space. 




C h a p t e r 3 
A FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-CONFIGURATION 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, a key challenge to the widespread adoption of WMNs 
is economics.  The pervasiveness of wireline technologies in many environments is so deep that 
for WMNs to achieve penetration, they have to be quicker and cheaper to deploy than the 
competition.  Since the cost of hardware for most technology is negligible over the lifespan of its 
use, this key economic incentive in WMNs has to be achieved in the areas of deployment and 
operation.  To achieve this, WMNs have to be self-configuring.  The best way to achieve this is 
via a consolidated framework enabled by cross-layer design.  In such a framework, features and 
information gathered in a particular layer or protocol phase gets utilized at the higher layers or 
stages. 
 
We seek to address this challenge by proposing a solution to the self-configuration of WMNs.  
This framework outlines a feasible architecture for wireless mesh networks utilizing a practical 
view on the usage scenarios.  We also explore critical factors influencing the performance and 
scalability of these networks, security issues (to ensure only authorized users are granted network 
access), as well as billing/accounting that is beneficial for clients as well as providers.  The 
framework has been termed ACORN (Automatic Configuration Of Radio-based Networks).   
 
I. OVERVIEW OF WMN OPERATION 
 
A wireless mesh network (WMN) is a communications network made up of radio nodes 
organized in a mesh topology.  The coverage area of the radio nodes working as a single 
network is sometimes called a mesh cloud. Access to this mesh cloud is dependent on 
the radio nodes working in harmony with each other to create a radio network.  
Typically, a mesh network is reliable and offers redundancy since links are typically "any-
to-any".  When one node can no longer operate, the rest of the nodes can still 
communicate with each other, directly or through one or more intermediate nodes. 
Wireless mesh networks are technology-agnostic i.e. they can be implemented with 
various wireless technology including 802.11, 802.16, cellular technologies or 




combinations of more than one type.  This characteristic is a very important feature of 
WMNs as some access technologies are better suited to certain parts of the network than 
others. 
 
A wireless mesh network can be seen as a special type of wireless ad hoc network. It is 
often assumed that all nodes in a wireless mesh network are static and do not experience 
mobility.  This is not always the case. The mesh routers themselves may be static or have 
limited mobility. Often the mesh routers are not limited in terms of resources compared 
to other nodes in the network and thus can be exploited to perform more resource 
intensive functions. In this way, the wireless mesh network differs from an ad hoc 
network since all of these nodes are often constrained by resources.  In addition, the 
mesh routers are more likely to have un-interrupted power source (AC power).  Wireless 
mesh networks have a relatively stable topology except for the occasional failure of 
nodes or addition of new nodes. The traffic, being aggregated from a large number of 
end users, changes infrequently. Practically all the traffic in an infrastructure mesh 
network is either forwarded to or from a gateway, while in ad hoc networks or client 
mesh networks the traffic flows between arbitrary pairs of nodes.  
 
WMN infrastructure can be decentralized (with no central server) or centrally managed 
(with a central server).  While there are advantages to the network being centrally 
managed, certain features (routing, link management etc.) have to operate in a 
decentralized manner for the network to function properly.  Nodes act as routers to 
transmit data from nearby nodes to peers that are too far away to reach in a single hop, 
resulting in a network that can span larger distances.  WMNs work in a similar fashion to 
the wired Internet.  Data will hop from one device to another until it reaches its 
destination. Dynamic routing algorithms implemented in each device allow this to 
happen. To implement such dynamic routing protocols, each device needs to 
communicate routing information to other devices in the network. The routing 
algorithm used should attempt to always ensure that the data takes the most appropriate 
route to its destination.  Different metrics can be utilized to make this decision 
 











1. Internet access occurs only via the mesh infrastructure nodes.  These nodes are 
largely stationary or move very infrequently.   
 
2. The subscription module (token or smartcard) used in the WMN devices is 
tamper-resistant.  Any attempts to modify its contents results in a network 
notification and invalidation of the token.  This Token contains the subscriber's 
ID, ESSID, assigned wireless channels (where applicable e.g. in a regulated 
environment), and PKI private key.   
 
3. IP address assignment is adaptable based on the network the node is allowed to 
join.  This differs from most other projects that concentrate on configuration 
and not deployment i.e. it is implicitly assumed that there are no competing 
networks.  This is also critical to our objective to allow commodity hardware to 
be used for different networks.  The key difference between nodes belonging to 
different networks would be subscription-based credentials stored on a module 
or some form of smart card. 
 
4. It is designed to be routing-protocol agnostic.  There is no need to design a 
routing protocol specifically for the network.  Any routing protocol (proactive or 
reactive) should be able to work within the mesh.  The discovery, boot-strapping 
and registration process all serve to aid Layer 3 reachability i.e. the topology built 
during network discovery should be useful to any routing protocol.   
 




5. The nodes used in the WMN are multi-channel, multi-radio nodes; Data and 
control packets can be sent out via either interface.  Channels are bound to links 
and not nodes (edges, not vertices).  Channel assignment seeks to assign more 
non-overlapping channels to connections closer to the root.  The number of 
channels assigned by node is limited to the number of radios present.  Channel 
re-use should be utilized wherever possible.   The following assumptions are 
made: 
 
 There is a control radio for management 
 The channel assignment is provided for self-configuration 
 The network has a known good connection state that can be used for 
fallback 
 
6. The composite metric used to determine the network's topology is unique.  It is 
calculated in a distributed fashion, adaptive and is weighted to give preference to 
link reliability (interference, Signal-to-Noise ratio), channel capacity (bandwidth) 
and queue occupancy which helps ensure intrinsic topology fairness.  Queue 
occupancy should a weighted average calculated over a sample period.  
 
7. Self-healing should not trigger a re-configuration of the topology tree.  It should 
use alternate links discovered during the discovery, bootstrapping and 
registration process.  This will ensure long-term stability of the network's 
topology.  This is done over the common signalling channel.  To prevent long-
term unfairness, in the event of a failure, a node should try to discover another 
parent node after a certain period of time.  It should do this by scanning for 
beacons promiscuously.  In the event that a node has only one link (i.e. no 
standby connections), it should automatically start the membership and 
initialization phase again. 
 
8. When the tree needs to be recalculated due to a long-term change in physical 
connectivity, it should be done as locally as possible i.e.  it should occur in the 




"leaves" of the tree first (children nodes) before spreading to the branches 
(delegated parent nodes) and maybe the root (parent nodes).  This takes 
advantage of the fact that nodes closer to the root (the 'branches') are more 
stable than edge nodes (the 'leaves').  This is due to the fact that those nodes are 
likely to be installed by the provider which means that their connectivity is better 
constructed with a less likely chance of failure. 
 
9. The algorithm is both distributed and centralized.  The discovery, boot-strapping 
and registration process are distributed while the centralized portion consists of 
agents running on the nodes reporting to a centralized manager with status on 
various network variables as well as configuration of parameters such as IP 
addressing and QoS settings. 
 
10. It is assumed that not all nodes are cooperative.  While we believe our scheme 
can work for community-based WMNs, it is developed using a service provider-




III. NODE INITIALIZATION 
 
 
A. Problem Description 
 
When a node initially powers up, it needs to perform certain operations to 
properly join itself to the network.  The stage is known as node initialization.  A 
node that is attempting to rejoin the network also has to go through these steps 
to ensure it rejoins the WMN in a non-disruptive and seamless manner. 
 




Typical operations that occur during this phase include basic node verification 
and channel assignment. 
 
B. Related Work 
 
Channel assignment is essentially a link layer (MAC) operation, a great deal of 
attention has been centered on the development of efficient MAC layer 
algorithms to minimize link contention and ensure relatively rapid establishment 
of links. 
Because of this, channel assignment is one of the most heavily explored research 
areas of WMNs.  Wireless is an intrinsically unreliable medium so it is of utmost 
importance that nodes in the network have some semblance of link organization 
if there is to be meaningful communication and cooperation among them. 
 
There have been many works tackling the problem of channel assignment in 
wireless networks.   
 
The design of MAC layer algorithms in WMNs pose challenges not necessarily 
experienced in other wireless technologies: 
 
• MAC for WMNs is concerned with more than one hop communication. 
Classical MAC protocols are limited to one-hop communication while 
the routing protocol takes care of multihop communication. While this 
approach makes protocol design easier, it does not work well in WMNs, 
because data transmission and reception at a node is not only affected by 
nodes within one hop but within two or more hops away. The hidden 
node issue in a multi-hop wireless LAN is such an example [26].  
 
• MAC is distributed and cooperative and works for multipoint-to-
multipoint communication.  Even in situations where the network has 
centralized control, multihop communication can cause local traffic 




patterns to be vastly different from one part of the network to another.  
The MAC protocol must ensure all nodes to cooperate in transmission.  
 
• The MAC protocol should have the knowledge about network topology 
which can help better cooperation among nodes in the network.  This 
can significantly improve the MAC performance in a multi-hop 
environment.  
 
There are two general approaches that have been used for the development of 
MAC layer protocols in WMNs: 
 
Single-channel MAC:  The single-channel MAC is the most pervasively 
deployed link layer scheme for wireless networks.  802.11 WLANs are based on 
the CSMA/CA protocol (Carrier Sense Multiple Access With Collision 
Avoidance).  Protocols such as those found in [27,28] are enhancements of the 
CSMA/CA protocol.  Schemes in this category typically adjust parameters of 
CSMA/CA such as contention window size and modify backoff procedures. 
Even though they may improve throughput for one-hop communications, their 
performance suffers in WMNs as they usually yield a low end-to-end throughput, 
because they cannot significantly reduce the probability of contentions among 
neighboring nodes.  The benefits of any scheme using this approach are likely to 
diminish in environments where links have frequent contention and packet 
collision. 
 
Cross-layer design leveraging physical layer techniques: Two major 
schemes exist in this category:  MAC based on directional antenna [29,30] and 
MAC with power control [31].  The first scheme relies heavily on advanced 
antenna technology to ensure that communication between nodes is as focused 
as possible to reduce interference.  However, its practical use is questionable as it 
is highly unlikely that the antenna’s beam will be perfect 100% of the time.  Cost 
and complexity or hardware is also an issue.  The second set of schemes utilizes 




power control to reduce interference [32,33]. This can help reduce exposed 
nodes problem, especially in a dense network, thereby improving spatial reuse in 
the network.  However, hidden nodes still exist and may become worse because 
lower transmission power level reduces the possibility of detecting a potential 
interfering node [34]. 
 
 
Multi-channel MAC:  A multi-channel MAC can be implemented on several 
different hardware platforms, which also impacts the design of the MAC. The 
design can be based on a single transceiver or multiple transceivers. 
 
With a single transceiver, only one channel can be active at a time.  Multiple 
nodes may operate on different channels to help boost network capacity.  To 
coordinate transmissions between network nodes under this situation, protocols 
such as the multi-channel MAC in [35] and the seed-slotted channel hopping 
(SSCH) scheme [36] are needed.  
 
With multiple transceivers, a radio includes multiple parallel RF front-end chips 
and baseband processing modules to support several channels operating 
simultaneously.  On top of the physical layer, there is only one MAC layer to 
coordinate the functions of multiple channels. An example of this is the Engim 
multi-channel wireless LAN switching engine [37].  However, as far as we know, 
designing an efficient MAC protocol for this type of physical layer platform is 
still an open research topic.   
 
Multi-radio MAC: In this scenario, a network node has multiple radios each 
with its own MAC and physical layers. Communications in these radios are 
totally independent. Thus, a virtual MAC protocol such as the multi-radio 
unification protocol (MUP) [38] or Microsoft’s Mesh Connectivity Layer [39] is 
required on top of MAC to coordinate communications in all radio links and 




channels.  Although, one radio can have multiple channels, a single channel is 
used in each radio for simplicity of design and application. 
 
While this approach is probably best suited for WMNs due to its simplicity and 
scalability potential, it could suffer from the same issues as single channel MAC 
solution i.e. a multi-radio MAC implementation can approached as a single 
channel MAC scheme for two radios in the same node. 
 
It is clear from the above that most of the underlying issues with MAC design 
and channel assignment in WMNs are a direct result of the shortcomings of the 
CSMA/CA protocol.  TDMA is probably better suited for channel access in 
WMNs.  While TDMA has its shortcomings (interference between time slots on 
the same frequency, bandwidth limitations due to dead time), its characteristic of 
allowing multiple transmitters to re-use the same frequency channel can be the 
missing ingredient in the scalability of WMNs especially in unlicensed frequency 
bands.  A variant of TDMA, dynamic TDMA, is used in the IEEE 802.16a 
protocol.  This utilizes a scheduling algorithm to dynamically reserve a variable 
number of time slots in each frame to variable bit-rate data streams, based on the 
traffic demand of each data stream. This helps make more bandwidth available in 
the system as needed thereby mitigating one of the shortcomings of TDMA. 
Our opinion is that a hybrid approach to the MAC design problem may actually 
work best for WMNs.  For example, combining TDMA with a scheduling 
algorithm such as that proposed in [40] can ensure better utilization of the 
timeslots thereby increasing bandwidth in the network.  This can then be used 
with a channel graphing algorithm that helps determine local regions of traffic in 
the network and minimize interference between timeslots on the same frequency 
i.e. different channels will be used in different regions of the network.  In some 
circumstances, power control can also be used to optimize network topology 
[41], minimize the interference between neighboring nodes, thereby improving 
the network’s capacity. 







It is assumed that the core network has achieved a stable connectivity state.  This 
is a fair assumption as all wireless mesh gateways (WMGs) are installed by the 
provider and are not likely to be moved.  The node initialization stage is for 
wireless mesh routers (WMRs) that are joining the network.  WMRs can either be 
installed by the provider or a subscriber.   
 
The WMR performs a hardware check to ensure that all its hardware is 
functioning properly.  It then starts sending out maintenance beacons (broadcast) 
every second at the base power level.  Transmitting at the base power level helps 
ensure that the broadcasts do not impact the network unnecessarily.  They also 
help assure that any nodes that receive it are definitely within good transmission 
range of the WMR. These beacons contain the following information: 
 
- Enterprise Service Set ID (ESSID) 
- Wireless Channels (WCH).  This indicates what channels have been 
assigned to the network.  It is set to zero (or unused) in a non-regulated 
environment. 
- Cipher of ESSID and Subscriber/Node ID encrypted with the Service 
Provider’s Private key.   
- Node Status (NSTAT) – Bridge (B), Gateway (G), Subscriber (S), Access 
(A), None (Unused) 
- One-way hash of Node Status (Bridge, Gateway, Subscriber, Access, 
None) and Subscriber/Node ID.  WMGs have Node IDs (NID) instead 
of SID 
 
All this information is pre-computed and encoded into the tamper-resistant 
token by the Service Provider upon subscription.  Also included in the token is 
the Service Provider’s PKI certificate) 





These beacons are forwarded all over the network till they arrive at a WMG 
which forwards them to the core provider network.  The core provider network 
contains the services that the network provides (authentication, authorization, 
accounting, billing, certificate services etc.) 
 
Every WMR/WMG that receives this beacon sends a beacon back to the 
originating node (unicast).  The node trying to initialize keeps track of the 
beacons it receives.  If it receives a beacon from another node three times in 
succession (within a specified time period), it stores the transmitting node in its 
neighbourhood table.  If it receives a beacon from a WMG (as indicated by the 
node status) and verifies it by decrypting the cipher of the ESSID and NID, it 
stores it immediately.   
 
In the event that the node receives multiple beacons that satisfy the requirements 
above e.g. when there is dense connectivity, the WMR does the following to 
select the nodes to put in its neighbourhood table: 
 
• The three nodes with the highest RSSI are put in the neighbourhood 
table.  These three nodes could be WMGs (which indicates that the node 
is closer to the ‘top’ of the network) or WMRs (which indicates that the 
node is closer to the ‘bottom’ of the network) or a mixture of both.  
WMGs are always preferred over WMRs. 
• Other nodes with RSSIs above a certain threshold are put in an alternate 
neighbourhood table.  If two nodes have the same RSSI, the node with 
the newer SID or NID is put in the neighbourhood table while the other 
is put in the alternate neighbourhood table.  In the unlikely event that 
two nodes have the same SID or NID, the node selects whichever 
beacon was received first. 
 
The alternate neighbour table serves two main purposes: 





1. It is used for rapid rebuilding of a node’s neighbourhood in case one 
of its preferred neighbours fails. 
2. It can help alleviate contention for resources.  This can help achieve 
load sharing in the network by diverting traffic away from overloaded 
nodes. 
 
At the end of this stage, the WMR should have its neighbourhood list complete. 
 




D. Protocol Flow Diagram 
 
 
On receipt of , verify the 
status of the node’s network 
membership by decrypting 
the cipher of the ESSID and 
SID. 
If node is verified, the 
information is passed to 
other neighbouring nodes.  
On receipt of perform 
node status check.
If node status is B or G, 
store in neighbour table 
permanently,
else store in neighbour 
table and start timer,
If timer expires and beacon 
is not received from node, 
purge from neighbour table. 
Once network core sees 
beacon from the node, it 
validates it by performing a 
dictionary lookup of its 
stored hashes.  If the hash 
does not match, the NID is 
stored in a ‘grey’ list. 
For networks that support 
roaming nodes, the ‘grey’ 
list can be verified against a 
trusted root CA to check if it 
is from another network.
Nodes with three highest 
RSSI values are inserted in 
neighbor table.  Others are 
put in alternate neighbor 
table
If two nodes have the same 
RSSI, then
Check SID or NID and 
choose higher value 
else
Select node whose beacon 
was received first 
 
Figure 3  Node Initialization 
 
 





IV. NODE BOOTSTRAPPING 
 
 
A. Problem Description 
 
After the node initializes, it has to properly join the network topology.  This is 
especially important in wireless networks as the ability to sense a node does not 
necessarily mean it is best to communicate using that node.  This stage is known 
as node bootstrapping.  The node uses the information gained from the 
initialization stage (neighborhood list, RF properties etc.) for this stage.  This 




As nodes receive and send beacons, the node gathers information about the 
topology network.  The node is able to establish its neighbourhood and 
determine which nodes it can ‘hear’ clearly.  This achieves two objectives:  
 
a. If all checks pass, it means the node is a valid member of the network and can 
be reasonably determined to be under the control of a valid subscriber.  If this is 
a guest node from a foreign network, the node still gets connected from a 
topology perspective but is not allowed to utilize any network services until the 
Network registration stage (described below) is complete.  Also, no local nodes 
will be able to pass any application traffic until after the Network registration 
phase. 
 
b. The node can use the received signal strength (RSS) of the beacons to 
determine which neighbours it is strongly connected to.  This helps it utilize the 




best connections possible.  The node can also use this information to help 
alleviate the "hidden terminal" problem.   
 
The hidden terminal problem has been well chronicled in the literature and many 
solutions have been proposed [42].  In our scheme, the hidden terminal problem 
is addressed in the bootstrapping stage using an iterative Power Control 
algorithm.  When a node bootstraps, it gradually increases its signal power in 
staggered steps from the base transmit level to see how many nodes is able to 
sense it.  This is done using a random time generator (RNG) to prevent 
synchronization with other nodes.  A special topology beacon is used for this 
purpose.  The beacon contains the ESSID and a hash of the ESSID and SID.  
Due to the staggering provided by the RNG and the very unlikely event that two 
nodes come up exactly at the same time, the traffic in the network can be kept to 
a tolerable level (no broadcast storm) with the devices transmitting in a poll-like 
manner (which helps ensure accurate reception of topology beacons).  Since 
WMNs are mostly static by nature, the process will be able to determine, with a 
high degree of accuracy what links and nodes can be interfered with by one 
node's transmissions. 
 
This step is only done during boot strapping and is done on a node-by-node 
basis.  By doing this, the node can determine the threshold signal level beyond 
which it can not reach any additional nodes.  This is the power level at which it 
can operate and be "totally visible" in the network.  When a node is able to sense 
another node it does not previously know, it replies to this node and adds it to its 
neighbour or alternate neighbour list.  This scheme should help ensure that the 
entire network reaches "power equilibrium" - new nodes can not sabotage the 
network by destroying existing communication.  Alternatively, the transmit 
power can be limited either by regulatory domain or the service provider. 
 
The checks in the "power up" stage help ensure that the nodes involved at this 
stage are not malicious.  Another advantage of using the power control method 




is that it takes into account the fact that the radio propagation properties of 
various nodes in the network may be different.  This way, the node can 
determine in a fairly accurate way what other nodes could possibly be affected by 
its transmissions.  This leads to the formation of "collision neighbourhoods" or 
cliques. 
 
Nodes that sense multiple "collision neighbourhoods" are designated "sponsor 
nodes" or "bridge nodes" (i.e. summary reports from multiple nodes contain 
different node sets).  The Gateway nodes are predetermined by the service 
provider as they are the nodes that constitute the wireless backhaul.  The closest 
neighbours will be determined based on received signal strength (RSS) and they 
will agree on a common channel based on the wireless technology used for the 
network.  The complexity of this stage is that wireless links are not necessarily bi-
directional and orthogonal channels (especially in 802.11 b/g) are scarce.  The 
likelihood that a node will be in multiple collision neighbourhoods is high 
(especially in dense WMNs).   
 
Each node sends out a summary report (broadcast) with all the nodes in its 
collision neighbourhood to other nodes after the bootstrapping stage is 
complete.  Based of all the received reports, each node builds a subtree with itself 
as the root (combined with the RSS information from the topology beacons) 
with paths chosen optimally.  This is a reactionary process.  Only nodes who lose 
paths will broadcast a new summary report which may or may not trigger path 
calculations at other nodes.  















Send topology beacons (broadcast)
Scheduling of beacons’ transmission is done based 
on output of RNG.  
If beacon is received with RSSI above threshold, 
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Figure 4  Node Bootstrapping 
 




V. NETWORK OPTIMIZATION  
 
 A. Problem Description 
 
The network optimization stage utilizes various mechanisms to ensure that the 
network topology built in the previous stages can be used to provide higher-layer 
services to subscribers.  It addresses features such as routing, mobility and 
network hierarchy determination.   
 
B. Related Work 
 
The network optimization stage utilizes various mechanisms to ensure that the 
network topology built in the previous stages can be used to provide higher-layer 
services to subscribers.  It addresses features such as routing, mobility and 
network hierarchy determination.   
 
Just like any typical network, WMNs require a mechanism that enables the nodes 
to dynamically exchange information based on measured link conditions.  
Historically, routing protocols provide this functionality in wired networks.  As 
expected, routing in WMNs is different from those in wired networks and 
cellular networks due to the differences in network architecture and node 
capabilities.  
 
Historically, WMN routing has taken its cues from ad-hoc network routing.  For 
example, mesh routers of Firetide Networks [43] are based on topology 
broadcast based on reverse-path forwarding (TBRPF) protocol [44] while 
Microsoft mesh networks are built based on dynamic source routing (DSR) [45].  
Despite the availability of several routing protocols for ad hoc networks, the 
design of routing protocols for WMNs is still an active research area for several 
reasons. First of all, new performance metrics need to be discovered and utilized 
to improve the performance of routing protocols. Moreover, the existing routing 
protocols treat the underlying MAC protocol as a transparent layer. However, 




the cross-layer interaction must be considered to improve the performance of 
the routing protocols in WMNs. More importantly, the requirements on power 
efficiency and mobility are much different between WMNs and ad hoc networks. 
In a WMN, nodes (mesh routers) in the backbone have minimal mobility and no 
constraint on power consumption, while mesh client nodes usually desire the 
support of mobility and a power efficient routing protocol. 
 
Such differences imply that the routing protocols designed for ad hoc networks 
may not be appropriate for WMNs.   The following features need to be present 
in an optimal routing protocol for WMNs: 
 
Performance metrics: Many existing routing protocols use minimum hop-count 
as a performance metric to select the routing path. This has been demonstrated 
not to be valid in many situations. Such protocols do not capture link quality or 
buffer occupancy in the performance metric.  To solve this problem, 
performance metrics related to link quality are needed. If congestion occurs, then 
the minimum-hop count will not be an accurate performance metric either. 
Usually Round trip time (RTT) is used as an additional performance metric. The 
solution is that a routing path must be selected by considering multiple 
performance metrics. 
 
Convergence: One of the objectives to deploy WMNs is to ensure robustness in 
the event of link failures. If a link breaks, the routing protocol should be able to 
quickly select another path to avoid service disruption. 
 
Load balancing: One of the objectives of WMNs is to share the network 
resources among many users. When a part of a WMN experiences congestion, 
new traffic flows should not be routed through that part. Performance metrics 
such as RTT help to achieve load balancing, but are not always effective, because 
RTT may be impacted by link quality. 
 




Scalability: Setting up a routing path in a very large wireless network may take a 
long time, and the end-to-end delay can become large.  Furthermore, even when 
the path is established, the node states on the path may change. Thus, the 
scalability of a routing protocol is critical in WMNs. 
 
Adaptive Support of Both Mesh Routers and Clients:  Considering the 
minimal mobility and no constraint of power consumption in mesh routers, a 
much simpler routing protocol can be developed for mesh routers than existing 
ad hoc routing protocols. However, for mesh clients, the routing protocol must 
have the full functions of ad hoc routing protocols. Consequently, it is necessary 
to design an efficient routing protocol for WMNs that can adaptively support 
both mesh routers and mesh clients. 
 
Much of the recent work in multi-channel 802.11 routing has looked at jointly 
solving the channel assignment and routing problem. An algorithmic approach 
that optimizes for throughput is considered in [46], and an approach that 
preserves network connectivity for QoS is explored in [47]. These are centralized 
solutions that assume the availability of a global network view (e.g., traffic 
demand, nodes’ status, etc.). However, a distributed approach (which we have 
adopted in this framework) may be more suitable to ensure scalability even when 
the network is centrally managed.  In addition to helping the network scale, 
having the routing protocol accommodate arbitrary routing topologies may help 
the WMN function better as a whole.  While this may appear to be a 
contradiction – after all, the WMN will probably have some semblance of a 
structure after network bootstrapping is complete – having the routing protocol 
operate this way can help ensure long-term fairness in the network’s traffic 
patterns.  If the routing protocol follows the channel assignment graph strictly, 
there is a distinct likelihood that certain parts of the network will be more heavily 
loaded than others. 
 




Weighted Cumulative Expected Transmission Time (WCETT) [48] and Metric 
of Interference and Channel-switching (MIC) [49] are routing metrics that 




As stated above, our aim is to make the framework routing protocol-agnostic.  
One of the reasons for this is that even in the most predictable networks (i.e. 
wired networks); different routing protocols offer different advantages 
depending on the network’s topology.  Just like in the wired world, we believe it 
is important for the service provider to have a choice of protocols to implement 
for their mesh network.  What is most important is the cost function 
(combination of metrics) used by the protocol accurately represents the 
network’s topology. 
 
Any routing protocol, with some modification, should be able to make use of the 
information generated by the node initialization and bootstrapping stages to 








VI. NETWORK REGISTRATION 
 
 
By utilizing the hello and topology beacons transmitted during the previous stages, all 
essential node parameters have been forwarded to the core network.  The core network 
also checks the subscriber’s details by decrypting the cipher of the ESSID and SID and 
checking it against the list of valid subscribers.  Once the subscriber is confirmed to be 
valid, the provider network sends a PKI certificate encrypted with the subscriber's public 
key.  This ensures only the targeted subscriber can decrypt the certificate.  This 
certificate will contain various parameters about the network such as the subscriber's IP 
settings, service level (QoS), roaming privileges etc.  This ensures that only valid 
subscribers get the necessary parameters to utilize the network’s services. 
 
The core network assigns IP addresses and other service parameters such as DNS 
settings to the nodes in the network.  However, it does this on a delegated basis using 
the node's status as an indicator.  Gateway and Bridge nodes are assigned distinct blocks 
of IP addresses and Network settings are assigned based on which bridge or gateway 
node is in the node's neighbourhood.  By definition, a gateway node should be within 
one hop (i.e. directly connected) of the core network while the bridge nodes are within 
one hop of the gateway nodes.  Subscriber nodes will have their IP addresses assigned by 
Gateway or Bridge nodes.  Alternatively, a subscriber node can automatically generate its 
IP address from its upstream node’s block using an RNG.  For subscriber nodes that 
have connectivity to the network via Bridge nodes, the subscriber node will choose the 
assignment from the closest “bridge” node.  To accommodate 'deep' networks, all nodes 
designated as subscriber nodes will perform address translation on their upstream 
interfaces for access nodes. 
 
 




VII. NETWORK MAINTENANCE 
 
Network Maintenance encompasses all of the phases mentioned above.  Topology 
maintenance is done on a distributed basis.  Nodes that lose connectivity to the network 
go through the node initialization and/or bootstrapping stages to re-join the network.  
Routing and topology changes are communicated during network optimization stage on 
an ongoing basis. 
It is important that security is achieved during network maintenance to prevent the 
network from being compromised.  Authentication and encryption may be jointly 
achieved by signing each encrypted frame with a hash of the public key and the device 
ID.  It is assumed that the device ID is unique.  To ensure the uniqueness and security of 
the device ID, a small (random) string of digits may be applied as an extension during 
registration.  This could be cross-checked against the neighbour list compiled apriori on 
each node during registration and initialization to be sure that the Device ID/private key 
pair belongs to the same node.  Any node that fails this test is assumed to be undergoing 
registration and is passed through the authentication and integrity tests.  This process 
leads them to establish a shared symmetric key with their parents (upstream nodes) and 




ACORN relies heavily on security.  As can be seen from the above, security is 
incorporated in every phase of the network.  We believe this is important for two 
reasons: 
 
• It helps prevent malicious nodes from becoming part of the network. 
• It helps ensure that security can be provided in a scalable and non-intrusive 
fashion. 






A. System Approach 
 
Security is best done in layers and deployed in a pervasive manner in a network.  
From a physical perspective, security credentials for the subscriber should be 
stored a physical token e.g. a storage card inserted into the node could contain 
security credentials that identify the subscriber and not necessarily the device.  
This will help separate the service from the hardware.  No network configuration 
material should be stored on the token and it should be impervious to tampering 
 
Since credentials are separated from the wireless device, service authentication is 
performed for the subscriber.  This helps extend the network’s flexibility to 
provide services for subscribers from other networks.  Authentication ensures 
that only permitted subscribers are allowed to use the network’s services.  
Authentication is also necessary to conduct central operations such as billing, 
subscriber management etc.  Authentication (via hash algorithms) and encryption 
(utilizing stream ciphers) at the link layer occurs between the nodes/devices.  A 
node can not join the network if it is not under the control of a valid subscriber.  
This helps prevent against replay or MITM attacks.  Only information that is 
publicly accessible in broadcast messages.  If sensitive information has to be sent 
in broadcast packets, it should be limited to information that has limited use in 
terms of impact or should be time-sensitive to limit the exposure.   
 
In ACORN, the subscription token is assumed to be impervious to tampering 
and all keying material is destroyed if the token is reverse-engineered in any way.  
Therefore, it is assumed that secret keys do not become available outside the 
device in an unsecured way. It is also assumed that a device will not be able to 
intentionally or inadvertently ‘leak’ its keying material to other devices, unless the 
keying material is protected, such as during key-transport.   
 




It is assumed that the security software and hardware operates as expected. Thus, 
implementations of security protocols, such as key-establishment, properly 
execute the complete protocol. Further, random number generators operate as 
expected.  It is also assumed that separate applications using the same radio – the 
so-called application endpoints – trust each other (i.e., there is no cryptographic 
task separation). In addition, lower layers (e.g., Network or MAC) are fully 
accessible by any of the application endpoints. These assumptions lead to an 
open trust model for a device: different layers of the communication stack and all 
applications running on a single device trust each other. 
 
The aim is to cryptographically protect the interfaces between different devices 
only based on the users being valid subscribers of the network.  The separation 
of the interfaces between different stack layers on the same device is addressed 
via proper hardware design.   
 
The layer that initiates a message is responsible for securing it.  We base security 
on the premise that when two devices exchange messages in a secure way, they 
will use the same link key, irrespective of whether this message is a MAC 
message, a Network message, or an application endpoint message.  End-to-end 
security should be applied such as to ensure that only source and destination 
devices have access to their shared link key.   
 
The SKKE (Symmetric-Key Key Establishment) protocol would be ideal for link 
layer security.  The building blocks required for SKKE include the AES block 
cipher [50], an unkeyed hash function (e.g., the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas hash based 
on AES[51]), and a (pseudo) random number generator. For maximum hardware 
and software reuse, the random number generator (RNG) itself may employ the 
AES algorithm.  The RNG could also be used for distributed IP address 
assignment.  
 




In the SKKE (Symmetric-Key Key Establishment) protocol, a trust relationship 
is established using a shared, secret, and symmetric key, referred to as a master 
key. This master key, for example, may be derived using some cryptographic 
method, may be installed by a CA, may be based on user-entered data (e.g., PIN, 
password, or key), or may be read off the package or chassis of the wireless 
product (e.g., a bar code). The secrecy and authenticity of the master key needs 
to be upheld in order to maintain the trust foundation of the SKKE protocol.  
To help ensure this, we propose that the key be burnt into the token upon 
subscription by the user. 
 
Successful completion of SKKE results in the following:  
• Both devices share a link key;  
• Each device knows that the other device has computed the correct link 
key;  
• No device has complete control over the link key that is established; and  
• No forward secrecy (Eavesdropping and compromise of the master key 
in the SKKE protocol exposes all the future and past communications).   
 
If the SKKE protocol is successfully used and each device knows beforehand 
that only the other device possess the master key, then implicit key 
authentication is achieved (i.e., each device is sure that no other device has access 
to the established link key). If possible, the keying material should be 
occasionally renewed.  This could be triggered by some external event such as 
self-healing or link re-establishment.  If the SKKE protocol is used without each 
device knowing who has access to the master key, then implicit key 
authentication can still be achieved provided that no eavesdropping occurs (i.e., 
no passive attacks), that no messages are modified (i.e., active attacks), and that 
the protocol is executed in an environment where the two devices have a non-
cryptographic way of establishing the identity of the other device. 
 




In order to be able to manage and control the security of the network, special 
security roles can be implemented in certain devices.  A device with security 
proxy capabilities can be used to configure a network by provisioning initial trust 
data to network devices. The initial trust data tells a device which devices to trust 
and can include device addresses, master keys, public keys, or certificates.  End 
devices need the capability to recognize (i.e., authenticate) a security proxy before 
accepting initial trust data. Authentication of a security proxy can be done using 
cryptographic means (e.g., public key).  Since a security proxy device may not 
always be kept physically secure, it should be impervious to revere engineering.  
A physical breach of the device should result in the destruction of all security 
related material. While the argument can be made that having security proxies 
can speed up the authentication process, we believe it may offer more 
functionality by improving the scalability of the network by helping distribute the 
security processing.     
 
ACORN uses a Certificate Authority (CA) or Key Distribution Center (KDC) to 
provide trust in the WMN.  The CA or KDC is kept physically secure (within the 
provider's network). So, compared with a security proxy, it should be less likely 
that a CA or KDC will be stolen, lost, or under physical control of an attacker. In 
keeping with traditional definitions, a CA distributes initial trust data for public-
key based systems (e.g., private keys, public keys, root keys, and certificates) and 
a KDC distributes initial trust data for symmetric-key based systems (e.g., a 
master key burnt into the subscriber’s token).   
 
For public key cryptography, the Certificate-Based Key-Establishment (CBKE) 
[52] can be used. CBKE uses public-key technology with digital certificates and 
root keys. A digital certificate is simply a public key together with the subscriber 
ID, signed by the CA. Certificates can provide a mechanism for checking 
cryptographically to whom the public key belongs and whether the subscriber a 
legitimate member of a particular network. Once a certificate and root key are 




securely provisioned to a device, active and passive attacks in subsequent key-
establishment protocols can be thwarted.  
 
163-bit Elliptic-Curve Cryptographic (ECC) techniques are recommended for the 
CBKE protocol. ECC techniques offer a reasonable computational load 
(especially since they will be performed infrequently in most application 
scenarios), and smaller key lengths for equivalent security than other techniques. 
Small key lengths are important to minimize the size of message storage buffers 
on network devices, which in turn reduces their implementation cost. 
 
Ideally, both the symmetric-key based and the public-key based protocols should 
be designed such as to maximize commonalities between message flows and to 
allow re-use of cryptographic building blocks. This way, a single implementation 
of telecommunication overhead and error handling seems to be possible. 
Furthermore, each protocol step, including those for elliptic-curve based key 
establishment with certificates, could be implemented within a single frame, due 










A. Problem Description 
 
This is a major area of contribution for our work.  As has been indicated in 
previous chapters, for WMNs to be truly successful in commercial deployments, 
the technology has to be attractive to Service Providers.  Even for WMN 
deployments with free subscriber access, the ability to track network usage may 
be important.  Having the knowledge of who is using the network can help 
improve targeted advertising and other revenue-generating activities used to 
operate and maintain the network. 
 
B. Related work 
A lot of this work in this area has been homogenous in nature i.e. only one type 
of network has been considered [53].  In [54] a solution is proposed where the 
billing mechanisms of GSM/GPRS networks are combined with WLAN 
technology.  However, their work does not incorporate the ubiquitous mobile 
station with seamless access to both networks.  The user has to stop and restart 
the service i.e. manually changes the network interface.  Other works [55] 
consider billing with one access technology.  Buddhikot et al [56] incorporated an 
accounting module into their IOTA gateway.  Though implied in the paper, it is 
not specified how different service levels can be tracked in the billing 
information.  Security is also an issue.  There is no provision made in the 
protocol to prevent the network providers from colluding to cheat the 
subscriber.  While it may argued that this has never been a major issue in the 
traditional PSTN, it must be noted that the stakes are higher in the next-
generation networks.  Not only does the volume of traffic vary depending on the 
application, connectivity is not necessarily circuit-based.  As such, there must be 
a mechanism to ensure that the user is billed only for traffic originated by or 
destined to his station.   




In their paper, Zhou and Lam [57] specify a model for secure billing in mobile 
networks.  Their work is not limited to any particular access network.  Their 
protocol is secure and does give a lot of insight into its feasibility in an integrated 
network.  However, they do not address the different service levels that a 
network may provide and how billing data may be generated for different 
services. 
The model presented seeks to address the need for accounting data for different 
types of services a network may provide. We also suggest a method for reliably 
and securely exchanging the data between the guest and home networks.  It is 
generally assumed that most inter-network roaming subscribers would be from a 
3G network.  While this view may be the general case (it is expected that most 
2G and 2.5G customers will eventually be 3G subscribers), it is quite possible 
that public WLANs (hotspot providers) and WMNs will also have a sizable 
number of subscribers.  Hence, it is important that the billing solution has the 
right mix of scalability and portability so that a wide spectrum of network 
providers will be able to implement it.  
 





Figure 5  Block Diagram of an Integrated 3G/WMN Network 
 





The following assumptions have been made. 
1. Protocol conversion, encapsulation and other network-related issues 
(seamless hand-off, interface selection etc.) are addressed by the 
underlying network architecture. 
2. The billing policies are decided by individual networks.  Since customer 
billing will always be performed by the home network, it is not necessary 
for the guest network to process a bill. 
3. The service itself may or may not be provided by the network.  Video-
on-demand, gaming etc. may be provided by an independent third party.  
The billing protocol is only for traffic transported on the network by the 
user.  It is not responsible for ensuring that subscription status of the 
user of external services. 
4. The user trusts its home network.  The home network does not 
necessarily trust the foreign network. 
5. The home and foreign networks trust the certificate authority. 
6. The user and its home network share a common secret key.  This key is 
stored on the user’s smart card/token in a tamper-resistant manner. 
The following notation is used to present elements of the scheme: 
 U = a user, possibly roaming in a 
foreign network.  When italicised, 
it represents an identifier. When 
used with a subscript, it represents 
the user’s identity to another entity 
 SPr() = Signing using the private key 
of the entity in parenthesis.  The 
key is already provided by the 
provider on the subscription token. 
 FN = foreign network.  When 
italicised, it represents an identifier 
 VP() = Verification using the public 
key of the entity in parenthesis 




 HN = foreign network.  When 
italicised, it represents an identifier  
 S = Signing using a temporary 
signature. A subscript indicates its 
attachment to an entity 
 k = a secret encryption key.  A 
subscript indicates its attachment 
to an entity.  The key is derived 
using an RNG.  
 V = Verification of a temporary 
signature. A subscript indicates its 
attachment to an entity  
 EPr() = Encryption using the private 
key of the entity in parenthesis.  
 H() = A one-way hash of the 
parameters in parenthesis 
 EP() = Encryption using the public 
key of the entity in parenthesis.  
 N = A nonce.  A subscript 
indicates its attachment to an entity 
It is a good security practice to use different keys for signing and encryption.  
This scheme adheres to this practice. 
Registration 
When a user U roams into a foreign network N (i.e. a network of which it is not 
a subscriber), the registration phase of the protocol is activated.  This can be 
done during the network registration phase.  Because the node initialization and 
bootstrapping stage still allow the node to join the network’s topology, it can 
attempt to register with the foreign network.   
Here are the steps in this phase: 
1. U tries to locate a network to join.  It broadcasts a nonce NU, its home 
network identifier HN and EP(HN)(NU, kU, FN).   
2. FN checks its certificate servers to see if it has a certificate indexed by 
HN.  If it does not, it performs step 3.  If it does, it goes directly to step 
4.  FN may have a certificate permanently stored for HN (due to a 
roaming agreement) or a cached one derived from previous requests 
from HN’s subscribers. 




3. FN sends an encrypted message EP(CA)(HN) to the certificate authority 
(CA).  The CA checks the HN, verifies it against its list of valid 
certificates.  If valid, the CA sends a signed, encrypted message with the 
certificate of the HN as its payload, SPr(CA)[EP(FN)( C(HN) )].  If not, it 
sends a null certificate message back to FN and FN terminates the 
registration attempt. The FN verifies the certificate and checks its 
contents.  The FN should be able to get the HN’s gateway location, its 
name and administrative information from the certificate.  Other 
attributes may include public keys for encryption and signature 
verification as well as the regional certificate authority that issued and 
signed the certificate.  This certificate can be stored by FN for the 
validity period of the certificate or a shorter, pre-determined period.  This 
will help prevent frequent requests to the CA during intermittent or 
transient connections. 
4. FN generates a nonce NFN and sends it to HN along with EP(HN)( NU, kU, 
FN).   
5. HN decrypts EP(HN)( NU, kU, FN) to recover ( NU, kU, FN).  From this 
information, it confirms the validity of the subscriber and the foreign 
network’s identity. HN also performs the actions in step 2 (if needed).  
HN then sends the following to FN. 
SPr(HN) [EP(FN)( UF , NF, VU, T)] 
EkU (NU, UF, SU, T) 
HN also generates a certificate CU = [UF , NF, VU, T, SPr(HN) ( UF , NF, VU, 
T)] and sends it to FN. 
6. FN sends EkU (NU, UF, SU, T) to U along with a one-way hash H(kU, NU) 
and CU.  U decrypts EkU (NU, UF, SU, T) to retrieve its nonce and signing 
key.  It also retrieves T which tells it how long the certificate is valid for.  
If T expires, U should re-register.  Therefore, T should be set to be long 
enough to allow for uninterrupted sessions but short enough to prevent a 




hijacking of the communication session.  The hash algorithm should be 
publicly known.  Along as kU is kept secret and NU is truly random, 
H(kU,NU) should generate a unique, symmetric key for session encryption 
between U and FN.  To ensure a balance, U should perform the hash as 
well to verify the key (it already knows kU and NU).  As long as the 
hashing algorithm is the same and no cheating has occurred, the 
computations by U and FN for H(kU,NU) would yield the same result. 
 
Figure 6  Registration Phase 
U HNCAFN
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If a node does not successfully register, the foreign network updates its ‘grey’ list 
and moves the node to its ‘black’ list.  This list is sent to registered WMN nodes 
during network updates.  The nodes update their neighbour tables by removing 
the node.   The only way the node can rejoin the network at this point is to re-
start the node initialization process. 
 
Service Request 
After registration at FN is complete, U may request for service.  It is important 
to note that at this stage, U is any node that requires service (roaming or local).  
For the sake of clarity, we have decided to keep the nomenclature consistent and 
use FN as a generic term to refer to the network providing service to the node 
(local or roaming). 
The request may be made by the application or the mobile station itself.  
Depending upon the application and protocol suite implemented, the actual 
request may be made in a variety of ways.  To make the protocol as generic as 
possible, a specific mechanism for service guarantees and bandwidth reservation 
at the logical and/or MAC layers is not postulated.  The main reason for this is 
the proposed loosely-coupled approach to integration.  As such, a multimode 
device (i.e. 3G and WMN) will use the protocol of the connected network to 
negotiate a service level. 
This works as follows 
1. U chooses a random number n and generates a chained series of one way 
hashes such that  
Hi(n) = H(Hi-1(n)) where i = (1,2,3,…) 
U keeps these hash values secret.  Once again, the hash algorithm is 
known to U and FN.  The security lies in the randomness of n.  These 




values should be pre-computed by U to save time in future stages of the 
protocol.  
2. U then sends UF, SU( UF, R, m, ti, H
m(n)) to FN.  It also sends FN a value j 
which is a counter initialized to 1. 
3. FN checks T for the certificate CU to ensure that the signature is still 
valid. If this is true, VU is then used to verify the signature.  The number 
of hashes m, the last hashed value Hm(n), and the request R are then 
known to FN.  Additionally, UF (the temporary identity of U) is known 
for billing purposes.  Different service requests sent during the same 
registration period are differentiated using ti (a timestamp in UTC 
format).  For each ti, a check should be made to ensure that it is less than 
the local time of the network.  A different (R, t) combination will require 
a new billing record.  R is sent to the lower level protocols to provide the 
requested service level.  The lower level protocols send back the 
provided service, R’.  It is possible that the network will not be able to 
provide the service requested so R and R’ may not be the same. 
4.  FN sends EP(HN)(CU, FN, R
’) to the HN 
5. HN decrypts EP(HN)(CU, FN, R
’).  It checks the temporary certificate to 
see if it valid.  If it is, it checks the roaming policy in the certificate of 
FN.  This policy contains the pricing policy for roaming users of the 
foreign network.  If HN agrees to the pricing policy, it sends an 
acknowledgement to the FN containing the following information  
S Pr(HN)[EP(FN)(CU,HN, R
’)], EkU (CU,HN, R
’) 
HN may also check the roaming restrictions of the user to ensure that 
the user is allowed to use the service.   




6.  FN verifies the signature and decrypts the contents of the message.  It 
sees that the HN has approved the service for the specified user. FN 
then sends the following to U.   
EkU (CU, HN, R
’, l) 
 l is a pre-determined interval determined by the FN based on the service 
provided.  It is used as a heartbeat during the bill collection phase to 
ensure that U is still using the service.  l should also be specified in the 
roaming policy so that the HN is aware of it. 
7. U decrypts the message.  If HN is correct, it knows that the HU has 
certified the provided service for its current certificate. It can also verify 
R’ meets its needs, if the application requires it.  It then sends the 
following as an acknowledgement to FN.  
EH(k) [EkU (CU, HN, R
’, l)]  where H(k) = H(kU, NU) (the session key) 
8. FN decrypts the message.  If it matches what was sent in 6, it starts 
providing service and starts billing.   
 
A possible issue here may be the number of different exchanges and 
computations that are needed for provision of service.  This is the most 
important phase of the protocol and it is essential that all parties play a role 
in determining what service can be provided (and is eventually provided) to 
U.  The evidence gathered in this stage can prove useful during bill 
repudiation by either of the parties. 
 
 















9 EH(k) [EkU (CU, HN, R', l)]
4 EP(HN)(CU, FN, R') 
7 EkU (CU, HN, R', l)
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Collection of billing data 
This phase of the protocol is based on the use of event-driven triggers.  These 
triggers reside between the user and the billing engine in a conceptual entity 
called the event handler.  These triggers dictate the actions of the billing engine; 
they tell it when to start, stop, pause or resume billing.  They also pass the user 
attributes needed to create a billing record to the billing engine.  It is important 
that the precision of these triggers are high for synchronization purposes.  For 
each particular flow, the billing engine should receive only one trigger at a 
particular point in time. 
The location of the billing engine and its triggers is very important.  Since per-
user flows constitute the information needed for billing, the flows have to be 
detected before there is any traffic aggregation in the network.  The billing 
engine has to be able to access the air interface directly to collect to retrieve the 
byte count.  Therefore, the billing engine has to be located as close to air 
interface as possible.  For a WMN network, it may be placed close to the gateway 
nodes.  In a 3G network, it may be placed close to the Radio Network Controller 
(RNC).  Even though the billing phase is composed of many components, it 
should be noted that they are functional and not physical components.  For 
instance, to obtain billing information as quickly and as accurately as possible, it 
may be beneficial to implement these components as part of the WMN Gateway 
nodes or RNC.  This could be done through the use of a specialized module that 
can be installed in a chassis.  Since these components are typically owned by the 
service provider and not the subscriber, non-commodity hardware can be used 
for this without affecting the network’s flexibility.  This kind of implementation 
may also improve scalability as more modules could be added as needed.  
All communication between U and FN is encrypted using the private key agreed 
on during the registration phase.  Apart from providing security, the FN can use 
this as an identification method to ensure that it updates the right billing record.  
The key will be different if the device re-registers.  This is consistent with the 




operation of the protocol since a loss of registration (i.e. loss of hash values) will 
cause the STOP trigger to activate.  The billing engine also uses information 
from the network protocols to determine which service is being billed.  As such, 




Figure 8  Billing Phase 
After the user has sent a service acknowledgement to FN, the START Trigger 
passes the credentials to the billing engine and billing starts.  It should be noted 
that through the other service requests and service reply exchanges, a billing 
record is already created in the billing database.  This is done to speed up the 
protocol.  If the service is not provided, the record should have no actual billing 
data.  The billing engine continually monitors the network for flows for all 




service requests.  With each successive l, the engine writes the byte count to the 
billing record and increments L by 1.  Since l is a static, time-based interval, it 
serves as a time counter as well.  This practice is acceptable since duration-based 
billing is often done using blocks of time.  It also does hash checking.  It runs the 
hash algorithm to see if the received hash value is the one just before the stored 
hash value.  If it is, it overwrites the stored value.  This is the logic behind the 
chained hash.  As long as the hash algorithm is one-way, the only entity that can 
know the previous value in the chain is the generator of the hash chain i.e. the 
user.  Using this method, it can be guaranteed the billing record is for the right 
user and the user was billed for service rendered.  Other decisions may also be 
made by the event handler as shown in the figure below. 
To further enhance the security of this stage, impersonation of the user node can 
be subverted by ensuring that the first hash value transmitted in the chain is 
signed by the node using SU (from the service request phase).  This can be 
verified by the foreign network using VU.  Signing the first hash value in the 
transmission does not impose an unduly heavy computational load on the node 
and accomplishes an important security objective. 
















Figure 9  Hash Checking 
 
If the application is network-aware, it may send messages to the PAUSE and 
RESUME triggers to pause and resume billing respectively.  This is intended to 
prevent the billing database from becoming too fragmented.  If the application 
senses that the network has become too degraded for acceptable service, it may 
use these triggers to ensure that the user is not billed for unacceptable service.  
When service is resumed, the billing engine need not write another record to the 
billing server; it just resumes writing data to the existing one.  The PAUSE 
trigger passes application state information to the RESUME trigger so that it is 




aware of the flows that are currently paused.  The PAUSE trigger may also be 
used to pause billing when a hash value interval is missed by the user.  This 
feature is useful in the event of a horizontal handoff.  The STOP trigger sends a 
message to the billing engine to stop writing to the billing record.  It does this 
when the user does not send a hash value for three consecutive hash value 
intervals.  Typically, when three hash value intervals are missed, it is either due to 
a degraded network connection or the user not using any applications.  Either 
way, the user is no longer actively using the network and billing should be 
stopped.   Even if the missed intervals are as a result of a handover, it is likely 
that the application would have timed out during this period and a new service 
request would have to be made. 
The billing server may just be a cache itself.  Depending on the complexity of the 
existing network architecture, a billing server may be already present.  In this 
case, the “billing cache” could be used as a temporary storage that writes its 
information periodically to the main billing system.  
Irrespective of the host network, the conceptual operation of the billing engine is 
the same.  The information gathered is transmitted to the billing server securely 
for storage for a specified period of time.   
 
D. Issues and Challenges 
Transmission of billing data:  The secure transmission of billing information is 
central to this protocol.  The transmission has to be authenticated, encrypted and 
signed by the sender i.e. the foreign network. The certificates retrieved during the 
registration phase have already provided the information needed to do this.  The 
foreign network uses the public key of the home network to encrypt the billing 
data and then signs the information.  The home network then verifies the 
transmission and decrypts the records.   




Since the transport network (for the billing solution) is the Internet, the 
connectionless nature of IP also raises some concern due to latency.  Billing 
records travelling over different paths or routes could arrive out of order.  
Higher layers of the protocol stack should take care of this issue.  It is not 
envisaged that latency will be a major concern as the billing application itself runs 
locally on the data store.  Besides, billing information is not time-critical as the 
user probably gets billed at pre-determined intervals e.g. monthly. 
Handoff within the Foreign Network:  Although it is assumed that handoff 
has already been handled at the network level, it is pertinent to postulate what 
the effect of handoff may be on this billing protocol.  Since registration and 
service requests occur at the network level, the same user information should be 
made available throughout the network.  The 3G networks already have location 
registers as part of their architecture.  However, this kind of location 
management is not native to WMNs.  Through the use of AAA servers, it may 
be possible for the network to know what foreign users are already registered and 
what services they have been permitted to use.   Thus, when a handoff occurs, 
the network could use L as a keepalive to notice that when the user moves.  As 
mentioned above, the non-receipt of a hash value by the billing system may be 
due to a degraded link.  It is also possible that the user has moved out of the 
range of the wireless access point.  The billing for the user/service combination 
is paused while the user moves within range of another access point.  When the 
new access point receives the hash value, it performs a hash on it and compares 
it to what is stored in the billing cache/server.  Due to one-wayness of the hash 
algorithm and the random number used initially, there will be (with high 
probability) only one hash value that would match this computation.  The newly 
received hash value is then put into the billing record, service is resumed and 
billing continues.  A failure of this operation would cause the application to fail 
and a new service request would need to be generated. 
Depletion of Hash Values:  Due to the need to use L as a keepalive as well as a 
timing mechanism for duration-based billing, L should be set to a value as low as 




possible.  The authors of [57] recommend a value of 6 seconds.  However, for 
long service sessions (e.g greater than 20 minutes), storing enough hash values on 
the user’s smartcard/token will be infeasible.  The most logical way around this 
issue is to generate enough hash values for short flows but implementing a 
mechanism that would allow the user to generate more hash values as needed 
without losing the non-repudiation characteristics of chained hashing.  The j 
counter can be used to implement this.   
As mentioned above, the j counter is initialized to 1 when the service is 
requested.  This information (along with L) is put in the user’s billing record.  
Once the user is about to sent the first hash value (which is the last to be sent 
according to the protocol), it increases the value of j by 1 and sends this to the 
foreign network.  Once the event handler sees the new value for j, it still does the 
hash check but also checks the value of j in the billing record.  If the hash check 
is true and the value of j received is an increment of 1 compared to the billing 
record’s information, the hash value in the billing record is not overwritten.  
During the computation period for new hash values, it is possible that the user 
will miss a hash interval.  Though this is not expected (hash algorithms are 
usually very efficient and fast), at the very worst, it will cause the billing to be 
paused.  The user then repeats step 1 of the service request phase to generate 
new hash values (preferably based on a new random number) and sends a new 
Hm(n) at the hash value interval.  To make this scheme work, it is necessary that m 
does not change.  It is recommended that m does not exceed 200.  200 hash 
values is sufficient for 20 minutes of service, assuming L = 6 seconds.  Given 
that the length of each hash is 20 bytes (e.g. a SHA-1 generated hash value), this 
will require about 4KB of storage on the smart card.  Most smart cards can 
provide this amount of storage.  
By doing this, j can be used as an indicator of how many times the user ran the 
hash algorithm during the session.  The user can not cheat the foreign network 
due to the check of the billing record.  Neither can the foreign network cheat the 




user as it has no way of recursively executing the hash algorithm to get previous 
hash values. 
Roaming:  An important piece of this protocol is to reduce the need for a 
formal roaming agreement between operators.  This is a key requirement if the 
goal of ubiquitous access (part of the promise of WMNs) is to come to fruition.  
To accomplish this, a “roaming policy” is included in each operator’s certificate.  
As shown in the service registration phase, when a request is made to a home 
network it validates the identity of the foreign network.  The roaming policy tells 
the home network how the foreign network bills visitors.  This policy should be 
detailed enough to enable the home network make an informed decision.  It 
should categorise traffic by class and unit of billing.  The price of each billing 
unit should also be clearly defined.  For instance, the hash value interval may also 
represent the block of time used to bill voice calls.  Even though this interval is 
in each billing record, it may not be pertinent to the billing of data and 
multimedia services. It may also state the geographic location of the foreign 
network.   
Based on its pre-defined thresholds, the home network then approves the service 
request.  This shows the foreign network that the home network has agreed to its 
service of the user.  Since there is the possibility of denial based on the foreign 
network’s roaming policy, a hybrid solution where the roaming policy is used in 
combination with a traditional roaming agreement can be used by the home 
network.  This gives the home network operator the flexibility to assure its 
subscribers of guaranteed services within a specified area.  For instance, an 
operator in the United States can sell a subscription to a user with guaranteed 
coverage in North America and optional service in Europe and Asia.  In this 
case, the identity of the networks can be checked against a local database 
included in the network’s certificate server.  If there is a match, the service is 
authorized immediately (thereby skipping the check with the certificate 
authority).  This will also be the case for a network whose roaming policy has 




been approved through a previous check.  This may also give the operator the 
flexibility offer more service levels.   
Push-Based Services: Due to their nature, some aspects of push-based services 
(e.g text messages, e-mail) may not be directly billable by the protocol.  However, 
this may not be a huge concern.  Even if a service is not requested by the user, 
the user has to register with the FN.  The FN can charge the HN a nominal fee 
for the registration of a user for the validity period of the certificate CU.  This 
may also be done through the roaming policy but is probably better implemented 
using a formal roaming agreement.   
Settling of Disputes: FN will submit the billing information, as well as U’s 
temporary certificate CU , to HN periodically.  This will enable FN to receive 
payment from HN.  The billing information includes the service request, the 
provided service, the hash value interval L and j (on behalf of U).  Therefore, a 
billing record should have the following: 
UF, R, m, ti, H
m(n), j, R’,  L, SU( UF, R, m, ti, H
m(n)), Hm-L(n) 
HN also adds a timestamp tr to indicate when the bill was received.  U will 
receive a bill from HN periodically.  If U disputes a bill, it requests that HN 
checks to see if it was wrongly charged.   This is acceptable since it is assumed 
that U trusts HN.  However, this request should be presented to HN within a 
particular time-frame. 
To verify the accuracy of the bill, HN will do the following: 
1. HN will use VU to check SU( UF, R, m, ti, H
m(n)).  HN also compares 
R and R’ 
2. HN will check to see m * j ≥ L.     
3. HN will check to see if HL(Hm-L(n)) = Hm.   Hm-L(n),  is the last chained 
hash value received from the user during billing.   
4. HN will check to see if (l * L) ≤ T.  Also, HN checks ti ≤ tr. 




 The first step is to prove that service was requested and the service provided by 
FN was no higher than the requested level of service.  Even though Ri is not 
signed, the service acknowledgement shows that the U accepted it. 
The second step proves that hash algorithm was run enough times to generate 
enough hash values for the service.  This step may be skipped if j = 1. 
The third step ensures that the service was provided to the user for the duration 
of the billing record. 
Steps 2 and 3 prove that U is responsible for the bill. 
The fourth step proves that the service must have been provided during the 
period when the temporary certificate was still valid.  The timestamp check is 
used to prevent replay attacks where FN provided the service to U at some point 
in the past and attempts to double-bill.  It may be possible for U and HN to 
collude on the fourth step.  However, this is highly unlikely.  Besides, FN does a 
check during service request to ensure that an accepted request was sent by U 
before it was received at FN.  It is also noted that neither of the timestamps is 
used for actual billing. 
If any of the steps fail, HN can conclude that U was wrongly charged.    
It should be noted that the accuracy of this stage (and indeed the protocol as a 
whole) is heavily dependent on the synchronization of time.  While small 
discrepancies may be tolerated, efforts should be made to synchronise the timing 
of all parties involved.  This may be done using a synchronization protocol (e.g. 
secure NTP) and a GPS clock.  
Bill Payment:  Although the payment arrangement between the home and 
foreign networks has not been addressed directly in this work, it is expected that 
the secure implementation of this scheme will leave no ambiguity when a bill has 
been certified as valid.  As such, the foreign network can send a detailed bill to 




the home network and expect it to be paid.  This can be done via a payment 
protocol that has been mutually agreed on by both operators.  Alternatively, the 
bill may be paid based on a payment scheme specified in the certificate of the 
foreign network. 




C h a p t e r 4 
EVALUATION OF THE SCHEME 
 
Our goal is to evaluate the building blocks of our framework vis-à-vis other architectures that 
have been documented in the literature. 
 
RoofNet [15] and MeshCluster [58] are two of the architecture frameworks that have been well 
documented in the literature.  In addition, prototypes and testbeds have been implemented to 
verify their performance and features. 
 
From the perspective of a network operator, the following have to be addressed by a viable 
architecture: 
 
• Performance issues  
• Scalability 
• Security 





The performance of any network is a critical component that needs to be considered and 
validated before the network gains acceptance for large scale deployment.  In the context 
of WMNs, issues which affect network performance include: 
 
1. MAC Layer Communication 
2. Mesh Routing 
3. Application and Service Perspective 
4. Interoperability and Integration 
 
 







MAC Layer Communication: Because of the nature of mesh networks, the MAC 
function should be accomplished in a distributed manner i.e. to establish multi-point to 
multi-point links between the mesh nodes quickly while the nodes are joining the 
network.  In addition, a MAC protocol for WMNs has to take connections with multiple 
hops into account.  
 
Roofnet uses the 802.11 MAC protocol and relies on its routing protocol to ensure that 
lossy links are avoided.  The authors of [15] note that nodes may interfere with each 
other and cause persistent packet loss.  The ETT (Expected Transmission Time) metric 
used to choose routing links tries to compensate for this by choosing links based on the 
loss rates of periodic broadcast probe packets sent at each of the 802.11b bit-rates (1, 2, 
5.5, and 11 Mbps).  It chooses the bit-rate that will achieve the highest throughput after 
accounting for the cost of 802.11 re-transmissions.  It does the best it can using the 
limitations of a MAC protocol designed for single-hop communications. 
 
MeshCluster employs the enhanced AODV-Spanning Tree (AODV-ST) protocol to 
proactively construct spanning trees whose roots are the gateways in the mesh network.  
By building a connectivity tree, the protocol aims to significantly reduce route discovery 
latency and achieve lightweight, soft state route maintenance.  The gateways periodically 
broadcast RREQ (route request) messages to initiate the creation of spanning trees. 
Before a RREQ is broadcasted, a gateway sets the destination-only flag in the RREQ and 
sets the RREQ destination address to the network-wide broadcast address. These 
settings differentiate normal route discovery RREQs from the RREQs for spanning tree 
creation.  As the RREQs are broadcasted hop-by-hop throughout the mesh network, the 
spanning tree is implicitly formed through the creation of reverse routes to the gateway 
at the relays.  For relay-to-relay communication, a relay node initiates a RREQ with the 
destination flag set and the destination address set to the address of the node to be 




reached. The destination flag is set because the most up-to-date path information is 
required at the source during path selection.  
 
ACORN uses a multi-stage approach to build neighbourhood cliques.  The 
neighbourhood discovery is done in a distributed fashion to ensure that the entire 
network does not get affected by multiple nodes initializing at the same time.  The use of 
an alternate neighbour table also helps improve convergence in the event that a node 
loses the connection to its preferred neighbour.  Our scheme also seeks to avoid 
collisions between nodes with overlapping transmission ranges using its iterative power 
control algorithm.  This helps ensure that we avoid collision and interference between 
nodes in close proximity. 
 
Routing: Mesh networking requires each node to share route information with other 
nodes. This functionality is assured by the mesh routing protocol.  In addition, features 
such as scalability, fault tolerance, QoS metrics, load balancing, and cross layer 
interaction.  Mobility and power management are also important in WMNs as users may 
roam (albeit infrequently) between WMRs and may be power-constrained due to their 
form factor.   
 
As indicated above, Roofnet uses the ETT metric to build its routing tables and achieve 
relatively stable performance in a lossy, high-interference environment.  The ETT Metric 
favours routes that minimize the expected transmission time required to deliver a packet 
across the network. ETT takes into account 802.11b transmit bit-rates as well as loss 
rates.  
 
In AODV-ST (used in MeshCluster), an RREQ contains a metric field which is set to 
zero by the gateway. When an intermediate relay receives an RREQ, it checks if the 
RREQ is a gateway-initiated RREQ. If the condition is satisfied, it creates a reverse route 
to the gateway provided the RREQ is received on the best known path to the gateway. 
The relay can make this determination because of the metric field contained in the 
RREQ. This field is updated by each intermediate relay to represent the characteristics of 




the path it has traversed. The specific handling of the field at each relay is dependent on 
the path metric being used. Once a relay creates a reverse route entry for the gateway, it 
sends a gratuitous RREP back to that gateway.  This gratuitous RREP also has a metric 
field that is set to zero initially. The field is updated at every intermediate relay on the 
path to the gateway. When an intermediate relay receives the gratuitous RREP, it creates 
a forward route to the originating relay. It updates the path metric to the originating relay 
with the metric value contained in the gratuitous RREP. 
 
According to [58], any routing metric can be used with AODV-ST as long as it satisfies 
two requirements: the metric must increase in value with increasing hop count and it 
must be a bi-directional metric, i.e., the metric must give equal weight to a path’s 
performance in the forward and reverse directions.  The ETT metric has been tested 
with AODV-ST but is not an optimal choice for a multi-radio WMN because it does not 
consider the frequency diversification of a path during path selection [39].  Further 
exacerbating this issue is the fact that AODV-ST is a distance-vector routing protocol in 
which link-level information is not disseminated by design.  The authors of [58] conclude 
that this can lead to sub-optimal routing for their architecture.  MeshCluster also 
employs IP-in-IP tunnels to reduce the routing table at relays to the sum total of number 
of relays and access subnets. 
 
According to the designers of MeshCluster, one possible solution is to use the Weighted 
Cumulative Expected Transmission Time (WCETT) metric [39]. WCETT requires 
knowledge about each link in the path, such as the link’s delay and its assigned 
frequency. This complicates the support of WCETT in AODV-ST.  Link state protocols 
that can be used instead of a link-aware routing metric include OLSR and OSPF. 
 
Due to the reasons above, one of the major design aims for ACORN was to make it 
routing-protocol agnostic.  We believe that the service provider should have a choice of 
what Mesh routing protocol is best suited to run in their network.  The node 
initialization and bootstrapping stages gather a lot of network information that can be 
fed into a routing protocol to assist in the computation of a metric that accurately 




reflects the network’s topology.  We believe this helps the flexibility of the architecture 
as newer, improved routing protocols can be integrated into the network over time 
without major changes to the architecture.   
Service Provisioning: Every application has its inherent characteristics which makes it 
more suited to certain platforms.  For example, a “chatty” protocol will work better in a 
wired network (with lots of high bandwidth links) than on a wireless network.  Due to 
the distributed multihop features of WMNs as well as the lack of cross layer interaction 
for most applications, there is a need to adapt the existing applications to WMN 
architecture. Another approach is to deploy new applications that focus on service 
delivery first and the network second.  This will lead to a service model with 
communication protocols that can deliver similar SLAs over multiple networks. 
 
One key element of service provisioning in WMNs is mobility.  Roofnet is specifically 
targeted for community networks where relays are expected to be 
static and end-user mobility is minimal.  There is very little support for mobility.  The 
MeshCluster architecture was designed to provide support for roaming users via Mobile 
IP and DHCP based mobility. 
 
ACORN does not directly address user mobility at this time.  As noted in [58], there are 
client-side peculiarities that have to be taken into account.  This is one of our priorities 
for future research.  With regards to service provisioning for roaming users, the billing 
phase of the infrastructure ensures that users can access services in a secure manner 
from any part of the network. 
 
Interoperability: Due to the emergence of heterogeneous wireless access technologies 
such as WiFi, WiMAX, Bluetooth, UWB, DVB etc. and the tremendous advancements 
in cellular systems, interoperability and integration have become major considerations 
for future wireless systems.  WMN is a potential candidate technology to enable the 
integration of various existing networks through gateway functionalities in the mesh 
routers.  
 




Neither Roofnet nor MeshCluster address interoperability in their frameworks.  ACORN 
was built with interoperability as one of the cornerstone requirements.  The network 
registration and billing phases of the protocol is essential in providing network services 
to supporting users from different network types and service providers.  The use of a 
PKI infrastructure helps establish trust without the need for an established roaming 




Scalability, reliability and robustness are important requirements for any network 
infrastructure not just WMNs.  In typical WMNs architectures of mesh networks, these 
factors appear to be at odds with each other.  For example, strategies designed to 
provide scalability generally require a hierarchical structure (not a native feature of 
WMNs). Scalability problems are even more critical in mobile mesh architectures. The 
typical scalability issues in multi-hop networking apply for WMNs as well.  When the 
scale of the network increases, the end-to-end reliability sharply drops, thereby 
diminishing the network performance. 
 
Designing a scalable mesh network requires the careful design and proper 
characterization of the physical layer mechanisms depending on the envisaged 
application scenarios and a fairly accurate idea of how many users need to be supported.  
Other considerations include backbone communication topologies, increased wireless 
spectrum capacity through the use of multiple radios, channels and access schemes. 
 
Roofnet, partly because of its focus on community collaboration, does not have an 
architecture that can scale on the service provider level.  There is no hierarchy in the 
WMN and the system is not engineered to provide SLA guarantees to its users.  For 
example, volunteer users share their internet connectivity with other users.  While this 
helps improve the redundancy and lower the cost of the network somewhat, it does not 
allow for a manageable system that can be monitored and provisioned centrally – an 
essential part of any service provider’s network operations. 





MeshCluster has a hierarchical structure through the use of gateways and relays so it 
holds some promise for scalability.  However, the use of AODV-ST puts a limit on 
scalability due to the reactionary nature of the routing updates. 
 
ACORN approaches scalability in the WMN by creating disjoint neighbourhoods of 
nodes.  These neighbourhoods have connectivity to each other via WMGs or ‘bridge’ 
nodes – WMRs that have rich connectivity to both WMGs and WMR in other 
neighbourhoods.  This structure takes advantage of the fact that in a service provider 
network, the majority (if not all) of the services are located in the Core of the network.  
This enables some structure to be put in place apriori to streamline traffic flow.  Another 
advantage of having disjoint neighbourhoods is the fact that a lot of ‘chatty’ link-layer 
traffic can be contained within certain areas of the network when necessary.  This helps 





Security is a critical step to deploy and manage WMNs. Since the access to any deployed 
wireless mesh network is possible for any wireless enabled device, it should be ensured 
that only authorized users are granted networks' access.  
 
Attacks can be either external or internal to the network and may exist at different layers 
in WMNs causing the networks' failure. At the physical layer, an attacker may jam the 
transmissions of wireless antennas or simply destroy the hardware of a certain node. At 
the MAC layer, an attacker may abuse the fairness of medium access by sending MAC 
control and data packets or impersonate a legal node. Attacks may occur in routing 
protocols such as advertising wrong routing updates.  At the application layer, an 
attacker could inject false fake information, thus undermining the integrity of the 
application.  Attackers may also sneak into the network by exploiting the cryptographic 
building blocks.  





Selfishness and greediness are two misbehaviours that are likely to take place in WMNs. 
Nodes may behave selfishly by not forwarding packets for others in order to save power, 
bandwidth or just because of security and privacy concerns. 
 
Neither Roofnet nor MeshCluster include any specific mechanisms to provide security 
natively in the network.  ACORN, on the other hand, makes use of secure protocols in a 
pervasive manner throughout the entire lifecycle of the network.  In general, two classes 
of attacks are likely to occur in WMNs 
 
i) External attacks, in which attackers not belonging to the network jam the 
communication or inject erroneous information. This can also be termed a DoS (Denial 
of Service) attack. 
 
ii) Internal attacks, in which attackers are either internal nodes that have been 
compromised or intruder nodes that are difficult to detect as they may be impersonating 
legitimate nodes. Both types of attacks may be either passive (eavesdropping) or active 
(modifying and injecting packets to the network). 
 
Due to the nature of the wireless medium, DoS attacks are hard to predict and mitigate.  
An attacker could jam the entire wireless spectrum with excessive traffic rendering it 
unusable.  In ACORN, the security credentials are decoupled from the hardware.  In 
addition, they are stored on a tamper-resistant token that is extremely difficult to reverse 
engineer without credential invalidation.  This makes it very difficult for an attacker to 
impersonate a valid subscriber.  No node can access network services until the Network 
Registration Stage.  By this stage, the validity of the node and subscriber would have 
been verified by the Core Network.  If the node does not have valid credentials – it 
would be extremely hard for an attacker to get some – it does not get added to the 
network’s logical topology. 
 




For legitimate nodes that may behave greedily, traffic policing can be imposed by the 
network to ensure that network control traffic is not subject to starvation.   
 
Authentication Authorization and Accounting (AAA): Authentication and 
authorization are important counter-attack measures in WMNs, allowing only authorized 
users to get connections via the mesh network and preventing adversaries to sneak into 
the network disrupting the normal operation. AAA is provided in most of the wireless 
applications and commercial services through a centralized server such as Remote 
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS). For WMNs, distributed authentication 
and authorization schemes with secure key management are important. To allow users' 
mobility with seamless and secure access to the offered services in the mesh network, 
authentication should be performed during mobile nodes' roaming across different 
WMRs and across different domains. 
To achieve this, continuous discovery and mutual authentication should take place 
between neighbours, whether these neighbours are mobile nodes or fixed/mobile mesh 
nodes.  Authentication should be regularly checked to ensure that the integrity of the 
network is not compromised. 
 
There also needs to be security mechanisms in place to prevent attacks on stored keys.  
To further ensure security of WMNs, security mechanisms need to be embedded into 
MAC protocols to detect and prevent misbehaviour in channel access, and into network 
protocols providing secure routing. Generally, pervasive security is desired as attacks 
occur simultaneously in different protocol layers.  It is also important to provide 
sufficient authentication for user nodes to authenticate mesh nodes or for a down stream 
mesh node to authenticate an upstream mesh node. 
 
As stated above, neither Roofnet nor MeshCluster include any specific mechanisms to 
provide security natively in the network.  ACORN, on the other hand, makes use of 
secure protocols in a pervasive manner throughout the entire lifecycle of the network.  It 
also leverages the ability of the network core to provide centralized security services 




(AAA, PKI etc.) to ensure that the nodes can be controlled and subscriber credentials 
validated before permitting access to network services. 
 
It is important to note that there are many similarities between the security scheme in 
ACORN and those in other wireless infrastructure technologies (e.g. 3G).  This is mainly 
due to the fact that a lot of the mechanisms have been well-established in the literature 
and real-world implementations and security best practices have been followed.  
However, there are a few key differences between ACORN and 3G in this regard: 
 
1. Security is pervasive and compulsory in ACORN.  All stages of the protocol 
have security built-in.  Unlike 3G, security is not an optional feature.  The user is 
not able to selectively enable/disable security on a per-application basis. 
2. Implementation of security is specific to the subscriber and not the device.  3G 
includes mechanisms for verifying the IMEI of the device.  Hardware device 
information is extremely hard to synchronize on a wide scale and is not 
considered for ACORN.  This is especially true if the goal of using commodity 
hardware is realized.  In ACORN, there is no assumption or need to secure the 
subscriber’s device hardware.   
3. For roaming users, the involvement of the foreign network (from a security 
perspective) is limited to information needed to provide network services and 
subscriber billing.  Authentication and validation of the user is still done by the 
home network.  This ensures that the home network is involved in user 
authentication and service authorization instead of implicitly trusting the foreign 
network and delegating all billing control to it. 
 
IV.  ACCOUNTING AND BILLING 
 
WMNs need special accounting mechanisms and tailored billing systems with 
appropriate business models considering the benefits of both mobile users and service 
providers. To assure service availability and continuity, Inter domain accounting is 




important in WMNs. High packet loss ratio and security requirements should be 
carefully handled in this case, where authentication, replay protection and data integrity 
are indispensable. The prevailing economic model requires the application of usage 
sensitive billing systems based on the gathered accounting information for each client.  
As far as we know, ACORN is the only documented WMN architecture in the literature 
that directly addresses billing and service delivery.  The billing phase of the protocol 
functions in a secure manner. All parties involved contribute in the exchanges needed for 
registration and service provision.  Non-repudiation of billing is also provided.  The 
billing solution is platform-independent.  To ensure network scalability and flexibility, it 
is designed as en extension to the basic network architecture.  None of the stages are 
dependent on the underlying network infrastructure. 
The billing protocol does not require major changes in the underlying network 
infrastructure.  For the user, a smartcard/token with the necessary credentials is all that 
is needed.  The certificate and authentication infrastructure can be added seamlessly to 
the network.  The billing components can either be implemented on a separate physical 
entity or as part of existing equipment (e.g. through the addition of a module).  This also 
helps improve the scalability of the billing architecture 
Since the proposed architecture does not require any “forklift” changes to the network, 
it can be implemented after the network is up and running.  Its cost can be managed and 
spread over a period of time.  For instance, a service provider may decide to issue new or 
updated tokens only to subscribers who have a roaming subscription. The protocol does 
not adversely affect the ability of the network to perform data transmission.  With the 
exception of the billing engine, all other parts of the protocol work at the application 
layer.  If the billing engine is implemented in hardware, any performance degradation 
may be reduced further.   
Through the use of trusted certificates with roaming policies, home networks can 
approve service for their subscribers on the fly even if they have never had formal 
dealings with the foreign network before. Certificate authorities can be regionalised 
(similar to Regional Internet registries) to speed up authentication of service providers. 





C h a p t e r 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
A major obstacle to the widespread deployment of WMNs as a connectivity solution for large 
wireless access networks is the operational efficiency of running such a network.  The cost of 
hardware (capital expenditure or ‘CapEx’) is rapidly falling while the cost of running the 
infrastructure (operational expenditure or ‘OpEx’) keeps rising.  Hence, even though WMNs 
offer the promise of quick and easy deployment (in comparison with wired access technologies), 
the cost of maintaining a stable level of service is still prohibitively high.  As a result, over the 
lifetime of a network, wired access networks may actually turn out to be cheaper.   
 
One key strategy to help make WMNs more competitive is to make it possible for the network 
to automatically configure wireless mesh nodes in a distributed fashion while ensuring security 
and service provisioning.  In this work, we address this challenge by proposing a solution for the 
self-configuration of WMNs and the provisioning of wireless subscriber connectivity.  This 
algorithm allows end-point WMN nodes to be automatically provisioned and configured in a 
secure, distributed and conflict-free manner.  It also introduces the concept of decoupling the 
service from the hardware.    
 
The architecture is both distributed and centralized.  The distributed portions include neighbour 
discovery, topology construction and beaconing.  The centralized aspects include monitoring 
agents deployed on nodes (used to monitor device and network metrics) and report to the 
central station, QoS and SLA guarantees and security.  A key aspect of our architectural 
framework is that is readily lends itself to a service-provider based service model.  We believe 
this is a critical feature of the system because WMNs have to pass the economic litmus test to be 










We are proposing the construction of a WMN testbed to verify our architecture in real-world 
scenarios.  While we are confident that the framework addresses the requirements of a service–
provider managed WMN, we would like to test different channel assignment and WMN routing 
protocols within the architecture for comparison purposes.  We believe this is important as one 
of our aims with the design of this framework was to allow for flexibility in the implementation 
of protocols for different functions in the WMN.  The evaluation of different MAC and routing 
layer protocols in a testbed will help guide the implementation of real-world WMNs. 
An important goal of this work was the reduction or elimination of provider roaming 
agreements which hamper true inter-provider service delivery.  As a future research goal, power-
efficient means for implementing the user aspects of the protocol will be explored.  Even 
though the most computationally-intensive parts of the protocol are done in the provider 
networks, the access node still has a fair amount of computation to do (random number 
generation, hashing).  This also has an effect on the amount of power that the mobile station 
consumes.   
It may also be possible to optimize and improve the efficiency of the billing phase so that 
registration and services can be set up more quickly.  This will be an important issue for the 
provision of time-sensitive services like multimedia applications.  It is also important for short-
lived sessions.  The protocol performs similarly for short and long service flows.  The effects of 
horizontal handoff (roaming within the same network) on billing were briefly explored.  
However, vertical handoff (e.g. if the user returns to the home network during service provision) 
will be explored in the future as well.  The billing phase may also benefit from an open protocol 
to access subscriber information (QoS, SLA etc.) irrespective of the underlying network 
architecture.  While it is expected that the billing protocol will only need a few tweaks to 
accommodate prepaid services, its implementation will be explored in the future as well. 
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